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 RECOGNIZING ODYSSEUS’ SCAR:  
RECONCEPTUALIZING PAIN AND ITS EMPATHIC 
ROLE IN CIVIL ADJUDICATION 
JODY LYNEE MADEIRA* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article proffers a consideration of how the expression of pain 
impacts the interpersonal dimensions of personal injury proceedings, 
contesting through philosophical logic and textual analyses of case 
law and legal practitioners’ texts the conclusion of scholars such as 
Elaine Scarry and Robert Cover that pain unmakes both the word 
and the world. Seeing pain as something that can and must be com-
municated, albeit in a different form than pain embodied, makes pain 
a much more profound force, comports with our understanding of 
pain as a physical yet interpersonally meaningful sensation, and has 
many evidentiary ramifications. 
 Taking as its premise the perspective that legal constructions of 
pain are intrinsically relational and empathic, this Article proposes a 
reformulation of pain as a dual construct, at once experiential and 
expressionistic, that is supported by both semiotic theory and by Witt-
genstein’s refutation of the private language argument associated with 
Cartesian dualism. Pain as a dual construct is the most appropriate 
model for the legal construction of pain in personal injury litigation. 
This Article then turns to the implications of reformulating pain as a 
dual construct, examining how its grounding in social practice de-
mands a more complex analysis than the existing model put forth by 
Elaine Scarry, who posits that imagination enables nonsufferers to 
access another’s suffering; this model is inadequate because pain-full 
phenomena must instead be grounded in social practice and struc-
tured by and through language. Only then is it possible to elucidate 
the development of an empathic connection between a sufferer and 
another and the legal consequences of that relation. This Article con-
cludes by describing how the model of pain that law currently adopts 
in principle (but not in practice) extinguishes pain’s interactive poten-
tial, demonstrating the necessity of a conscious recognition of inter-
personal pain-full reality. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
For what is story if not relief from the pain 
of the inconclusive, from dread of the meaningless? 
    Mona Van Duyn, Endings 
 In Book 19 of the Homeric epic The Odyssey, when the weary hero 
Odysseus at last returns home from Troy to the island of Ithaca dis-
guised as a beggar, he wins the good will of his wife Penelope by giv-
ing her news of her husband. Ignorant of the hero’s identity but ea-
ger to show her gratitude, Queen Penelope asks Euryclea, Odysseus’ 
former nurse who now serves as royal housekeeper, to wash the 
“stranger’s” feet. As Euryclea takes the hero’s foot upon her lap to 
wash his leg, she touches a scar upon Odysseus’ thigh incurred long 
ago in a boar hunt on Mt. Parnassus and instantly recognizes him. 
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Euryclea’s recognition of Odysseus is sparked not by the bond that 
she shares with her former charge, but by the recognition of a famil-
iar scar—one that she helped to heal and for which she felt compassion.  
 One millennium later, we, too, see others with various “scars” or 
injuries upon them (albeit ones that are incurred in contemporary ac-
tivities considerably more plebian than boar hunting) that are famil-
iar to us from personal experience or cultural knowledge. These scars 
convey identity, allowing us to recognize another as a sufferer. And 
from time to time, we are called to sit in judgment upon such inju-
ries; to weigh their existence, extent, and incurrence; and to deter-
mine what response they merit—in essence, to recognize another as 
an authentic sufferer whose injury merits compensation.  
 Whether in social interaction or in personal injury litigation, a 
suffering identity is always a contested identity. It is an identity that 
entitles its bearers to a wide variety of interpersonal and institu-
tional reactions and remunerations, from compassion to punitive 
damages to disability checks. Thus, before he can be accorded that 
status, one who claims to be suffering must establish both that his 
suffering is authentic and that he should be held harmless for its 
cause. This aura of legitimacy becomes harder to establish as the 
stakes of suffering are raised. One need only recall many Americans’ 
disgusted reaction to Stella Liebeck, the elderly plaintiff in the 
McDonald’s coffee burn case, to realize that it is likely that someone 
suffering from an injury reputed to be “everyday” may not be consid-
ered deserving of a 2.9-million-dollar verdict.1 That lawsuit prompted 
the evolution of the so-called Stella Awards, allocated to the year’s 
most “wild, outrageous, or ridiculous” lawsuits.2 Clearly, the efficacy 
with which we may trust our recognition of scarred others is imper-
iled: “American tort law has become politically controversial because 
for many citizens it seems to have lost its moral resonance.”3 This is 
so despite the fact that “most tort claims are morally uncontroversial 
and that juries often regard plaintiffs’ claims with skepticism.”4  
 Pain is at once one of life’s great tragedies and greatest triumphs; 
“[p]ain on occasion becomes the site of encounters we can do nothing 
except witness in respect.”5 Encounters with pain are often the sub-
ject of courtroom proceedings; personal injury trials provide jurors 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 
360309, at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994) (unpublished); JAY M. FEINMAN, LAW 101: 
EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 133 (2000). 
 2. See The True Stella Awards, http://www.stellaawards.com (last visited Nov. 13, 
2006). 
 3. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 144 
(2001). 
 4. Id. at 145. 
 5. DAVID B. MORRIS, THE CULTURE OF PAIN 255 (1993) [hereinafter MORRIS, 
CULTURE].  
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with the chance to witness another’s pain—pain as it is embodied—
by understanding and crediting expressions of pain. It also demands 
that jurors potentially go far beyond witnessing, even though they of 
course cannot actually experience another’s suffering. Yet, surpris-
ingly few legal scholars have chosen “to explore the intimate connec-
tions among pain, death, and the law” as they relate to personal in-
jury litigation, instead focusing upon such issues in the context of 
criminal punishment.6 Perhaps this is because “the languages of pain 
through which social sciences could gaze at, touch, or become textual 
bodies on which this pain is written often elude” us.7 Yet, because 
bodies and their sensations are constantly the subjects of adjudica-
tion, there is a need to “highlight[ ] the way law imagines the body in 
pain as well as the way pain and death become jurisprudential facts.”8  
 As a means of constructing bodies and their circumstances, law 
discursively constructs both bodies and pain as “facts of legal life.”9 
And it does so in ways that have definite consequences for the ways 
in which others respond to a body that claims to be suffering from 
pain. What this Article proffers is a consideration of how the expres-
sion of pain impacts the interpersonal dimensions of personal injury 
proceedings, contesting through philosophical tools and a textual 
analysis of case law and legal practioners’ texts the conclusion of 
scholars such as Elaine Scarry and Robert Cover that pain unmakes 
both the word and the world. Though such scholars recognize that at-
tempts at the expression of pain exist, recognizing that pain as ex-
pressed builds interpersonal relations instead of destroying them 
necessarily changes the consequences of its expression. Seeing pain 
as something that can and must be communicated, albeit in a differ-
ent form than pain embodied, makes pain a much more profound 
force, aligns with our understanding of pain as a physical yet interper-
sonally meaningful sensation, and has many evidentiary ramifications. 
 Such an analysis brings to the fore many questions which are at 
the heart of this Article. How do the unique demands of the legal fo-
rum impact upon and alter the expression of pain? What dimensions 
does pain assume when expressed? What prompts an adjudicator to 
listen to another’s pain and suffering?10 What is the legal dialogue in 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See Austin Sarat, Introduction: On Pain and Death as Facts of Legal Life, in PAIN, 
DEATH, AND THE LAW 1, 1 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001). 
 7. Veena Das, Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain, in 
SOCIAL SUFFERING 67, 67 (Arthur Kleinman et al. eds., 1997). 
 8. Sarat, supra note 6, at 2. 
 9. See id. at 4. 
 10. As David Morris states, listening is a moral act: “The decision not to listen con-
tains an implicit judgment about . . . the value that you attribute to the person you judge 
not worth listening to.” DAVID B. MORRIS, ILLNESS AND CULTURE IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 
263 (1998) [hereinafter MORRIS, ILLNESS]. A refusal of the adjudicator to listen to the 
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which attorneys invite others to experience the suffering of another 
by imagining their pain and persuade these others that a given re-
sponse is necessary? How does the trier of fact weigh the painful ex-
periences of the body that hangs in the balance?  
 Taking as its premise the perspective that legal constructions of 
pain are intrinsically relational and empathic, this Article resolves 
these questions in two separate steps. In Part II, it probes current 
theories on the relationship of pain to language and on the impact of 
pain-full11 expressions on interpersonal relations to demonstrate the 
need to push beyond existing conceptualizations of pain as solely 
physical and experiential. This Article then proposes a reformulation 
of pain as a dual construct, at once experiential and expressionistic, 
and demonstrates how this reconstruction is supported by both semi-
otic theory and by Wittgenstein’s refutation of the private language 
argument associated with Cartesian dualism. Part III of this Article 
explains how pain as a dual construct is the most appropriate model 
for the legal construction of pain in personal injury litigation, explor-
ing how the expression of pain is accomplished through a narrative 
structure that is morally authoritative, prompting jurors to desire in-
terpersonal identification with the plaintiff’s experience of pain. 
 In Part IV, this Article builds upon the implications of reformulat-
ing pain as a dual construct, examining how its grounding in social 
practice demands a more complex analysis than the existing model 
put forth by Elaine Scarry, who posits that imagination enables non-
sufferers to access another’s suffering. The inadequacy of the imagi-
native model stems from the fact that pain-full phenomena must in-
stead be grounded in social practice and structured by and through 
language. This Article then elucidates the development of an em-
pathic connection between a sufferer and another to whom suffering 
is expressed and the natural consequences of that interpersonal rela-
tionship. It concludes by describing how the model of pain that law 
currently adopts in principle (but not in practice) extinguishes pain’s 
interactive potential, demonstrating the necessity of a conscious rec-
ognition of interpersonal pain-full reality.      
 Recent legal scholarship makes ample use of interdisciplinary ef-
forts.12 In the context of law and narrative, there is a consensus that 
“scholarship reasonably should be interested both in how narratives, 
                                                                                                                     
plaintiff’s claims is fatal, for “[w]hen we turn a deaf ear to someone, we reject any claim 
upon us, we sever communion, we eliminate the speaker from our field of action.” Id.  
 11. This spelling of “painful” is used intentionally to refer to the state of being not 
merely in pain but “full” of pain. 
 12. “Law no longer can be studied or practiced as if it were a discipline referenced by 
its own norms. . . . [L]aw is a derivative discipline, one which draws on other disciplines to 
explain how rules have developed and should develop.” The Spirit of Renaissnce, N.Y.U. L. 
SCH. MAG., Spring 1993, at 44, 45-46. 
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in general, tend to ‘work’ (persuade), and in which ones, in particu-
lar, succeed.”13 I approach pain as legal subject matter from the per-
spective of narrative jurisprudence, an interdisciplinary perspective 
that has become quite familiar to law, particularly in the last quar-
ter-century.14 Such a perspective devolves from investigating what 
can be called the phenomenology of law, or how law is constructed as 
a life world through narrative. Through such a lens, law is “not 
merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we 
live.”15 Such perspectives “have become a focal interest in contempo-
rary jurisprudence.”16 
 In this Article, I explicate several legal authorities through tex-
tual analysis, a cousin of content analysis, which is a qualitative 
communication research methodology.17 This textual analysis exam-
                                                                                                                     
 13. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, 
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2105 (1989).   
 14. For exemplary instances of narrative jurisprudential analysis, see ANTHONY G. 
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000) (chronicling the role of narrative 
in law and judicial rulemaking); LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gerwitz eds., 1996) (examining law as narrative and rhetoric); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 
(1995) (exploring the intersection between narrative literature and law); ROBIN WEST, 
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 346-439 (1993) (discussing jurisprudence as narrative 
and relating a decline in judicial grants of habeas relief in death penalty cases to narrative 
factors); Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (in-
vestigating the intersection between legal normativity and narrative); Richard Delgado, 
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 
(1989) (describing law as storytelling and counter-storytelling); Kim Lane Scheppele, Fore-
word: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (discussing the implications of a narra-
tive approach to law and concluding that this approach allows for greater pluralism in le-
gal reasoning); Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern 
Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985) (advocating the reading of legal theory as a 
form of narrative). 
 15. Cover, supra note 14, at 5.  
 16. James R. Elkins, Reading/Teaching Lawyer Films, 28 VT. L. REV. 813, 826 n.67 
(2004). 
 17. Although some recent articles purport to use content analysis, they may not de-
fine exactly its methodological contours. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of 
Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science “Researcher’s Black Arts,” 35 RUTGERS L.J. 
103, 116-18 (2003) (conducting a content analysis of all published federal decisions to 
gauge the federal judiciary’s use of social science research). But other articles do effectively 
define this technique. See, e.g., Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on Equality and 
Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 517-23 
(2004) (applying a constructionist content analysis to forty-one U.S. Supreme Court opin-
ions regarding gender discrimination to ascertain how the Court defined gender and equal-
ity). Communication scholars have defined content analysis in a rather specialized sense 
as a systematic method of compressing text into a few content-driven categories. See gen-
erally KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY 
(1980) (discussing the epistemology, logic, and methodology of content analysis). I, how-
ever, refer to content analysis in its broader form, which refers to “any technique for mak-
ing inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of mes-
sages.” OLE R. HOLSTI, CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 14 
(1969). Such a technique involves surveying text for manifest (as opposed to latent) con-
tent, rendering data comparable across many different sources. In researching this Article, 
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ines practitioners’ texts, such as American Jurisprudence and Corpus 
Juris Secundum, as well as case law on the understanding that such 
sources constitute authoritative statements in their own right, re-
vealing how lawyers see pain as a sensation and what arguments (or 
narrative constructions of pain) are most successful.18 This textual 
analysis is oriented towards the perspective of the social construction 
of reality, which posits that there is never one “truth,” since “truth” 
is largely a matter of one’s social epistemology, such that our opin-
ions are formed or constructed by social factors, including culture, 
upbringing, and life experiences.19 As such, this analysis is not just a 
playful exercise in interdisciplinarity, but one that deconstructs and 
thereby informs the processes by which pain is expressed in personal 
injury litigation.  
II.   PAIN, LANGUAGE, AND THE LAW 
A.   Existing Perspectives on the Relationship of Pain to Language 
 There is certainly a difference of scholarly opinion on what rela-
tionship pain may have to language. Scholars such as Robert Cover 
and Elaine Scarry insist that constructions of pain are destructive, 
destroying language and undermining interpersonal relations, 
thereby demolishing the foundation for the self in society (and thus 
the inner self as well, from a social constructionist perspective).20 
Others such as Veena Das and Alan Hyde emphasize that pain is 
constructive, summoning empathy21 and building relations between 
                                                                                                                     
my own categories emerged from preexisting divisions within practitioners’ texts, and I 
then filtered the text of all sources and case law through this categorical list. 
 18. Short of interviewing trial lawyers, there is no easier way to acquire or compile 
such information.  
 19. For a discussion of the social construction of reality as a research perspective, see 
PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A 
TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966). Berger and Luckmann posit that so-
cial order is a human product and that when we participate in the social we engage in a 
continuous intrapersonal maintenance cycle of self-incorporation, negotiation, and reflec-
tion, so that one’s subjective reality undergoes perpetual modification. Id. at 149-53. Thus, 
Berger and Luckmann tie the formation of the self in society to the formation of one’s pri-
vate (or nonpublic) self. 
 20. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE 
WORLD 172 (1985) (“Physical pain is not only itself resistant to language but also actively 
destroys language . . . .”); Sarat, supra note 6, at 7 (stating that Cover separated “pain and 
language; pain exists outside of language, it has a materiality that language lacks. It is de-
structive of language itself.”). 
 21. I use the term empathy because I believe that it most closely approximates mental 
engagement with the pain and suffering of another, what Max Weber has called “verste-
hen,” or “understanding,” and what George Herbert Mead has termed “taking the attitude 
of the other.”  MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 87 
(A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947); GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND 
SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST 299 (Charles W. Morris ed., 
1967) (1934)). This necessarily encapsulates sympathy and compassion but goes farther 
than each of those in recognizing the interpersonal demands made by comprehension of 
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bodies, thereby strengthening the foundations for both the social and 
inner selves. It is necessary to summarize each perspective before 
evaluating their respective merits.  
1.   The Expression of Pain as Destruction 
 Those who claim that expressions of pain are but hollow echoes of 
pain itself argue that pain cannot shed its physicality, that it is so 
profoundly interior a state that it can never be apprehended by an-
other. Scarry recognizes that language, “the power of verbal objectifi-
cation,” is “a major source of our self-extension” and “a vehicle 
through which . . . pain could be lifted out into the world and elimi-
nated.”22 This occurs through a process in which a sufferer initially 
relies primarily on language to assert pain before eventually regress-
ing to a prelinguistic communicative state.23 But pain is unsuited to lin-
guistic expression since, unlike language, it is a “primary physical act.”24 
 Scarry theorizes that this physicality renders pain unsharable in 
two ways. First, pain is embodied in the sufferer and not in others 
who encounter the sufferer; nonsufferers confront only claims of em-
bodied pain, not that pain itself. Pain, then, inspires doubt, since it is 
“that which cannot be denied and that which cannot be confirmed.”25 
Claims of embodied pain may also be inaccessible because their sheer 
physicality seems too unreal or unmanifested, because they seem too 
tenuous based on lack of visible indicia,26 or because they are too hor-
rific to lie within the realm of lived experience. For Scarry, then, the 
unsharability of pain stems from its unique, stark physicality—a 
condition with the linguistic ramification of lacking an object in the 
                                                                                                                     
another’s pain and suffering. Clark notes that Mead as well as John Dewey, William 
James, and Charles Horton Cooley all believed that the ability to empathize was the 
“unique human capacity that made sociation possible.” CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND 
COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 35 (1997). Empathy was not conceived of as a 
“monolithic” experience but consisted of “solo” or “joint” engagement with others. Id. On 
the solo level, one mentally engages from a distance, focusing “attention on the self and ex-
perienc[ing] oneself primarily as separate from the other actors in an encounter.” Id. On 
the joint level, “the awareness of self fades, and one experiences intersubjectivity, a sense 
of merger with the group.” Id. I do not distinguish between these two levels in this Article 
but assume that a juror encountering a plaintiff in pain is moved to engage with this indi-
vidual on one or both levels.  
 I specifically avoid the use of the term “sympathy” to avoid confusing the emotion to 
which I refer with the pejorative implications of “sympathy” in the judicial sense as a coun-
terpart to reason and an improper basis for decisionmaking. 
 22. SCARRY, supra note 20, at 54. 
 23. According to Scarry, pain at first “monopolizes language” through the act of com-
plaint, which “becomes the exclusive mode of speech.” Id. However, she continues, ulti-
mately pain “actively destroys [language]” and in fact “bring[s] about an immediate rever-
sion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before 
language is learned.” Id. at 4. 
 24. Id. at 52 (stating that “[p]ain is a pure physical experience of negation”). 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. Id. at 3-4. 
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anterior world. Scarry maintains that pain as an interior state is dif-
ferent from other interior states such as loving, fearing, and hunger-
ing in that, while these other interior states have objects in the out-
side world, physical pain has no such referential content and “is not 
of or for anything.”27 Thus, for Scarry, the physical embodiment of 
pain confirms an “absolute split between one’s sense of one’s own re-
ality and the reality of other persons,” thereby rendering the pain of 
others less plausible.28 
 With respect to pain’s impact upon social relations, Scarry places 
primary communicative emphasis on embodied pain, positing that 
“whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its unsharabil-
ity, and it ensures this unsharability through its resistance to lan-
guage.”29 The same physical materiality which renders embodied 
pain too rich for language also renders it an isolating experience that 
is very visible in its intensity, “an almost obscene conflation of private 
and public” that “brings with it all the solitude of absolute privacy 
with none of its safety, all the self-exposure of the utterly public with 
none of its possibility for camaraderie or shared experience.”30 Artistic 
representations of pain’s experience, such as those in Ingmar Bergman 
films, illuminate the simultaneity of isolationistic exposure, “repeat-
edly coupl[ing] physical pain with intense moments of humiliation.”31  
 Scarry does not, however, contend that every attempt to express 
pain lacks purpose. Instead, she asserts that such efforts are forceful 
endeavors that are accompanied by a great deal of risk since one who 
attempts to express and thereby objectify pain fundamentally 
changes it. Thus, she cautions, “the human attempt to reverse the 
de-objectifying work of pain by forcing pain itself into avenues of ob-
jectification is a project laden with practical and ethical conse-
quence.”32 For Scarry, then, the languaging of pain objectifies embod-
ied pain, forever changing it into a shadow of its former self. This 
contrasts with understanding the languaging process as merely a 
transformation of physical pain into a different form that is an au-
thentic construction in its own right. Ultimately, then, Scarry inter-
prets pain as a physical sensation embodied in the sufferer, foreclosing 
the possibility that it is also an interpersonally meaningful expression.  
 Robert Cover, too, sees pain and language as apposite in the sense 
that pain lies outside of language and has a materiality that lan-
                                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 5. 
 28. Id. at 4. As Scarry states, “[S]o incontestably and unnegotiably present is it [for 
the person in pain] that ‘having pain’ may come to be thought of as the most vibrant exam-
ple of what it is to ‘have certainty,’ while for the other [unsuffering] person it is so elusive 
that ‘hearing about pain’ may exist as the primary model of what it is ‘to have doubt.’ ” Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 53. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 6. 
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guage cannot have.33 An inability to language pain entails a social 
and cultural inability to recognize and accept another’s pain or to 
share one’s own pain. This of necessity means that law as an inter-
pretive project is apposite to the experience of pain, since the act of 
“ ‘interpretation’ suggests a social construction of an interpersonal 
reality through language. . . . [B]ut pain and death destroy the world 
that ‘interpretation’ calls up.”34 Like Scarry, Cover posits that pain is 
destructive of social relations and not conducive to them. Because 
pain destroys the “normative world of a community,”35 it threatens to 
defeat the ability to invent, communicate, strengthen, and reinvent 
the legal constructions that form such a critical part of the founda-
tion for that normative world.  
 Nonetheless, Cover also recognizes that legal confrontations with 
bodies in pain are inevitable and unavoidable since the law cannot 
simply shove aside the question of bodies and their pain as being too 
tricky for its interpretive schemas. Law is an intrinsic part of “nor-
mative world-building,” and so it cannot shrink from handling the 
bodies whose affairs it adjudicates without undermining its authori-
tative basis, for “[a] legal world is built only to the extent that there 
are commitments that place bodies on the line.”36 The “interpretive 
commitments of a community,” whether they follow or resist the law, 
“[are] realized in the flesh.”37 Cover also sees legal hermeneutics as 
acts of power over bodies, evoking Scarry’s assertion that expressing 
pain involves asserting power over and forcing pain into paths of 
objectification.38 The exercise of this interpretive power is accompa-
nied by high stakes and should accordingly be granted gravity and 
significance.39 Like Scarry, then, Cover sees pain as an embodied 
physical sensation.  
2.   The Expression of Pain as Construction 
 Others, however, do not envision pain as condemned to silence 
through its physicality, reasoning that pain assumes interpersonal 
                                                                                                                     
 33. ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: 
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203, 205 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 206. 
 36. Id. at 208. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Indeed, in a passage that goes more toward the context of punishment than that 
of personal injury, Cover asserts that “the relationship between legal interpretation and 
the infliction of pain remains operative even in the most routine of legal acts.” Id. at 210. 
 39. Cover aptly illustrates this by pointing to the signing of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as an example of a momentous interpretive occasion—the rebellious interpretive 
act asserting independence from Great Britain in which signers “ ‘mutually pledge[d] to 
each other [their] Lives, [their] Fortunes, and [their] sacred Honour’ ”—and thus a prime 
opportunity in which to “incorporate[ ] an awareness of the risk of pain and death.” Id. at 
209 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776)). 
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reality through language, that “[l]anguage is how we live ‘in’ pain, 
not in some fantasy of community divorced from it.”40 Instead, ex-
pressions of pain are what enable us to both communicate and me-
morialize these “transactions between language and body . . . by 
which the antiphony of language and silence recreates the world in 
the face of tragic loss.”41 Das equates the enunciation of pain with a 
reconstruction of the life world, “an articulation of the world in which 
the strangeness of the world revealed by [pain], by its 
noninhabitability, can be transformed into a world in which one can 
dwell again, in full awareness of a life that has to be lived in loss.”42 
While pain as an unsharable entity condemns a body to dumb soli-
tude, pain as a sharable entity defeats loneliness and reaffirms life. 
In order to express pain, one must acknowledge that there is an in-
terested audience, necessitating an emergence from one’s self into 
the world to encounter the other. Communication is creation, and 
creation invites cure. Even expressions of incurable pain give the suf-
ferer control over its experience, for articulation implies a degree of 
mastery of or power over the articulated entity. Speaking truth to 
power necessitates first that one speak. And control presumes a care 
for one’s life, for there is no need to assert control over matters with-
out concern for the outcome of events.   
 According to Das, the expressibility of pain, a transaction between 
body and language, is also a transaction between self and other, a 
“movement between bodies” through which “the sentence ‘I am in 
pain’ becomes the conduit through which I may move out of an inex-
pressible privacy and suffocation of my pain.”43 Pain thus triggers a 
claim for acknowledgement, not merely a “referential statement,” 
and so it is not an “inexpressible something that destroys communi-
cation or marks an exit from one’s existence in language.”44 Crucially, 
the difficulty of languaging pain does not lead to the demise of com-
munication and community but illustrates the human struggle to 
come to terms with a language perpetually inadequate for accurately 
delineating intensities such as love or suffering.45 Part of the human 
burden is to respond “to the sense of loss when language seems to 
fail.”46 Hence, the struggle to construct pain is the struggle to con-
                                                                                                                     
 40. PETER FITZPATRICK, Why the Law is Also Nonviolent, in LAW, VIOLENCE, AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 142, 162 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001). 
 41. Das, supra note 7, at 68. 
 42. Id. at 68-69. 
 43. Id. at 70. 
 44. Id. 
 45. As Das queries, “[I]f the language for the inexpressibility of pain is always falling 
short of my need for its plenitude, then is this not the sense of disappointment that human 
beings have with themselves and the language that is given to them?” Id. at 70. 
 46. Id.  
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struct the self, “to free the self that has become frozen in language.”47 
Das, then, grounds her analysis of pain and its interpersonal poten-
tial in the same understanding of pain as Scarry and Cover—pain as 
one physical entity, albeit one that is communicable. 
3.   Towards a Reconceptualization of Pain 
 Both of these competing perspectives accept that pain is con-
structed; they differ, however, as to what the consequences of that 
construction may be. This division is largely predicated not only on 
whether embodied pain is seen as being distinct from pain as ex-
pressed but also on which of the two is the primary source of inter-
personal meaning—a factor that is in turn contingent upon the de-
gree to which pain is seen as a necessarily physical entity.  
 Scarry and Cover perceive only one conceptualization of pain—a 
physical embodiment that can never shed its corporeal anchor 
through linguistic or metalinguistic expression. To attempt to ex-
press physical pain, then, is to attempt to call an apple an orange—to 
make pain into something it is not and can never be. From this per-
spective, pain has authentic meaning only for the suffering body it 
inhabits and no positive meaning-making occurs on an interpersonal 
level. Additionally, meaning is primarily generated by embodied, 
corporeal pain and not by pain expressed, which is meaningful only 
in that it points to the existence of physical embodied pain. 
 Debating the nature of pain when pain is seen only as a physical 
entity is a zero-sum game. The theory that pain is world-destroying 
is distinctly unsettling, for after all, if we must still suffer in silence 
even after we have attempted to language pain, then both language 
and the human bond have failed us. This position, then, cannot ac-
count for our awareness that pain elicits meaningful compassion. 
Similarly, Das’ perspective seems intuitively correct but does not 
adequately explain what about pain is meaningful and why or how 
the incommunicability of physical experience hinders the production 
of pain-full meaning, what physical pain withholds from the expres-
sive act. It is necessary, then, to move beyond both conceptualiza-
tions of pain as such. Moving beyond these existing conceptions will 
require working backward, refining fundamental notions of human 
communicative processes and constraints until we rediscover what is 
sensible to include in such a reformulation. 
 The first step towards an effective reconceptualization of pain is to 
examine in more detail what is implied by “creation” and “destruc-
tion.” This terminology has rather unfortunate and exclusionary 
positive and negative connotations; either a process is one of crea-
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tion, enjoying fertile associations and ushering in life, or it is a proc-
ess of destruction, infused with the fetid stench of rot, inviting doom 
and decay. In addition, the terms are imprecise; creation is essen-
tially nothing more than a neutral force which simply refers to the 
evolution of new meaning that may bode either good or ill. Thus, 
even destructive changes are creative, rendering such terms virtually 
useless for our purposes. Instead, we must seek to explore whether 
pain facilitates or hinders the formation of interpersonal relations.   
 The second step towards an effective reconceptualization of pain, 
ironically, lies in acknowledging the human inability to refrain from 
communicating. As humans, we cannot be silent but ceaselessly 
communicate vast information about our inner selves, consciously 
and unconsciously, to others around us. Emotions, psychological 
frames, and physical states all distill into bodily mannerisms such as 
posture and expression. We know that these bodily mannerisms are 
sense-making cues for others, and so to an extent we care about and 
may attempt to control these perceptions. Once others observe us act-
ing in a certain manner, that manner becomes a key component of 
our current makeup—either we are happy or sad, tired or energetic, 
feeling fit or in pain.  
 The third and perhaps most difficult step towards an effective 
reconceptualization of pain involves confronting directly the back-
bone of Scarry and Cover’s proposition that pain destroys interper-
sonal relations—its inevitable physicality, what cannot be communi-
cated to others. This pessimistic communicational picture seems to 
derive its fearful imagery from the fact that one’s pain is never per-
fectly comprehensible to another. While neither perspective advo-
cates that pain is perfectly translatable into language, both acknowl-
edge the difficulties and tensions implicit in this translation, since 
pain has an inherent quality of silence. The term silence simply refers 
to the verbal and nonverbal impossibility of conveying experience it-
self—a universal failing of all languages. Narrative, for example, de-
scribes and does not constitute experience. One can experience a nar-
rative only through its linguistic textures—an experience of syntax 
and semantics, not of the narrative subject matter in the life world. 
The profundity of this silence differs according to the narrative sub-
ject matter; a failure to communicate pain can carry severe interper-
sonal consequences when pain renders it difficult to be civil and to 
complete essential tasks. 
 Yet, pain is a condition that exists to be shared since it cries out 
for diagnosis and commiseration. Even severe pain that cannot be 
languaged is expressible; patients in pain are often asked to select a 
number or facial expression associated with the severity of pain ex-
perience, a selection which in turn prompts a doctor or other inter-
pretive actor to term that pain, among other things, “moderate” or 
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“severe.” In other cases, “pain overflows speech with a florid growth 
of metonymical and metaphorical terms, captured, for example, on 
the McGill Pain Questionnaire,”48 which asks sufferers to select de-
scriptive terms from a predetermined list.49   
 Silence is always implicated in and by expressions of pain, in our 
awareness that, however much we might know about the suffering 
person, we will never (and can never) know all.50 Because the physi-
cal sensation of pain is only accessible through pain as communi-
cated, it is a profoundly social phenomenon; but because it is distinct 
from and inherently more physical than any expressive medium, 
“[t]here is no completely pure or innocent account of pain untouched 
by the constraints of writing.”51 However, no narrative account is 
“pure” or “innocent.” Silence is present in every narrative; there is 
always that which lies beyond language. Suffering merely implicates, 
but does not always result in, “practical breakdowns of speech”;52 it 
“is not ultimately ungraspable but merely resistant to description.”53 
Languaging suffering may even be symptomatic of the enduring hu-
man struggle to describe extreme emotional and physical states. 
Thus, even when it isolates, “silence is not simply an experience of 
the solitary individual but a social consequence almost built in to the 
interpersonal structure within which suffering occurs.”54 Interper-
sonal isolation, then, is not an inherent feature of pain itself, but of a 
social construction and response to pain that evolves over time.55  
                                                                                                                     
 48. Robert Kugelmann, Pain as Symptom, Pain as Sign, 7 HEALTH: INTERDISC. J. FOR 
SOC. STUD. HEALTH, ILLNESS, & MED. 29, 37 (2003). 
 49. The McGill Pain Questionnaire may ask subjects to choose from terms describing 
sensory qualities such as as “throbbing,” “shooting,” “stabbing,” “sharp,” “cramping,” 
“gnawing,” “hot,” “burning,” “aching,” “heavy,” “tender,” and “splitting”; affective qualities 
such as “tiring,” “exhausting,” “sickening,” “fearful,” “punishing,” and “cruel”; and evalua-
tive words such as “mild,” “discomforting,” “distressing,” “horrible,” and “excruciating.” See 
Ronald Melzack, The McGill Pain Questionnaire: Major Properties and Scoring Methods, 1 
PAIN 277, 279 (1975). 
 50. “[S]uffering encompasses an irreducible nonverbal dimension that we cannot 
know . . . because it happens in [this] realm beyond language.” MORRIS, ILLNESS, supra 
note 10, at 196.  
 51. MORRIS, CULTURE, supra note 5, at 3. 
 52. MORRIS, ILLNESS, supra note 10, at 196. 
 53. Id. at 195.  
 54. Id. at 197. It is true that pain can isolate the sufferer more in some interpersonal 
situations than in others, such as when the suffer is afflicted with chronic pain. Signifi-
cantly, however, narratives of chronic pain are not testimony of the inevitable failure of 
language, but of a specific communicative inability to consistently take account of and 
maintain high interpersonal attention to pain. 
 55. This is exemplified by examining a context in which pain apparently destroys lan-
guage. The silence of suffering grows more profound as pain and suffering increase and be-
come a more frequent subject of discourse. As Morris states, in public discourse, the silence 
of suffering is now “something of a cliché—despite the contrary evidence of an almost in-
terminable discourse of contemporary complaint, lament, litigation, symptom mongering, 
and public confession.” Id. at 196. There is indeed a danger that suffering may culminate 
in silence when it grows discursively wearisome for chronic sufferers and those around 
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 There are undoubtedly other dimensions, such as the distinction 
between a modernist and postmodernist orientation toward pain, 
that would be useful to explore in order to further explicate pain’s po-
tential for altering interpersonal relations.56 But in the end, the 
awareness of how pain should be conceptualized comes from our own 
profound experience as continual communicators. In light of our 
ceaseless communicative endeavors, we can accept that someone who 
is suffering from pain is bound to express it sooner or later. Even if 
one attempts to conceal his pain from others, it will gradually mani-
fest itself somehow, even if as irritability or merely a grimace or 
grunt. An awareness that another is in pain summons a response so 
natural that it is visceral—a change in the interpersonal connection 
that we share with the suffering person. Our universal response (as-
suming that we are not attempting to inflict the pain ourselves) is to 
respond to symptoms of suffering with compassion. This, then, is the 
change that expressions of pain wrought—a change that enhances 
interpersonal relations, adding new empathic depth, encouraging us 
to feel for another.  
 Pain becomes interpersonally meaningful when its presence be-
comes apparent to others, whether one learns about it by sight, 
                                                                                                                     
them, when months of complaint “exhaust care-givers and even family.” Id. at 197. 
Through the onslaught of silence, Morris posits, chronic pain can isolate since it “breaks 
down understanding” and “places people in utterly different worlds of feeling.” MORRIS, 
CULTURE, supra note 5, at 73. Sufferers can “learn[ ] their own helplessness” when others 
cease to listen and “withdraw into an uncommunicative isolation constructed in response 
to an environment where effective aid has all but vanished.” MORRIS, ILLNESS, supra note 
10, at 197.  Incurable pain thus “becomes an experience about which there is increasingly 
nothing to say, nothing to hope, nothing to do” and “constitutes a radical assault on lan-
guage and on human communication.” MORRIS, CULTURE, supra note 5, at 73, 78. 
 56. It is possible that disbelief over whether pain can be authentically expressed in a 
constructive manner may stem from a particular, modernist narrative orientation, one of 
two very different cultural attitudes towards narrative, pain and suffering, and the body. 
According to modernists, “suffering is a quintessentially private act.” MORRIS, ILLNESS, su-
pra note 10, at 197. Nonsufferers occupy a certain communicational position not from 
“moral failure” or from “a lapse of . . . charity or courage” but from an “aversion or detach-
ment” that accompanies “a structural position we cannot help but occupy.” Id. Thus, we are 
never in “direct relation to another’s suffering.” See id. Suffering instead “forc[es] us to rec-
ognize and to contemplate our fated detachment as each person . . . inevitably suffers 
alone.” See id. at 197. Postmodernism accepts that suffering is an intrinsically interior ex-
perience, as it acknowledges that it is impossible to offload a portion of the suffering onto 
another. However, postmodernism recognizes the duality of signifier and signified—
experience and expression—and thus that another’s suffering may become palpable when 
communicated to those around them, allowing a voice to emerge. See id. at 199. Detach-
ment here, then, stems from a failure to communicate and is not an inevitable interac-
tional position. Thus, a postmodern orientation towards the expression of pain offers “a po-
tential to readjust the ‘human position’ of suffering” from modernist separation and de-
tachment to postmodernist engagement. See id. at 200. Through communication, the “af-
fliction has broken through into language,” and “[w]e are brought into the presence of 
words that cross over, imperfectly, from the other side of torment.” Id. Thus, suffering is 
infused with an emotive, interpersonally moving power to compel a response, altering and 
improving our difficult relation to suffering. Id. at 200.      
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sound, or statement. A verbal assertion of suffering is little different 
from a grimace, hunched body posture, or limp—a range of expres-
sive behaviors can indicate a pain that has meaning, that needs to be 
alleviated. Each is a communicative act that facilitates and deepens 
interactive potential. It is the absence of such cues that would be 
world-destructive, terminating as it would any possibility of develop-
ing an informed basis for interpersonal engagement.   
 Moving away from the models of Scarry, Cover, and Das, we en-
counter a reconstruction of pain that, building upon Das’ vision of 
pain as world-creating, is at once embodied and expressed, physical 
experience and communicative construction. This new conceptualiza-
tion is above all a reformulation of pain based on the semiotic signi-
fier and signified, on the sensibilia and sensation found in the social 
construction of reality, and on Wittgenstein’s theory that interior 
sensations are nonetheless public. Instead of being a unified concept, 
perpetually rooted in a suffering body, pain is instead best conceptu-
alized as a dual construct—pain embodied and pain expressed. 
Physical pain—pain embodied—is distinct from, yet tied inextricably 
to, pain as expressed, its communicable counterpart. Seeing pain as a 
dual construct acknowledges that pain can be perceived on both in-
trapersonal and interpersonal levels (although some elements of em-
bodied pain can never be languaged) and thus that pain as expressed 
may nonetheless illuminate many contours of embodied pain. As a 
category, pain expressed is quite broad, entailing everything that 
needs to be interpreted that is not self-evident. This encompasses verbal 
declarations and nonverbal gestures that communicate pain and even 
extends to artifacts such as medical evidence that must be evaluated.  
 Notwithstanding the fact that it is not essential that there be a 
perfect correlation between a physical sensation and an expression of 
that sensation,57 pain as a dual construct also effectively accounts for 
silence, acknowledging that only physical behaviors that are perfor-
                                                                                                                     
 57. As Adam Smith argues,  
There may be some correspondence of sentiments between the spectator and 
the person principally concerned, the spectator must, first of all, endeavor, as 
much as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other . . . . After all this, 
however, the emotions of the spectator will still be very apt to fall short of the 
violence of what is felt by the sufferer. Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, 
never conceive, for what has befallen another, that degree of passion which 
naturally animates the person principally concerned. . . . The thought of their 
own safety, the thought that they themselves are not really the sufferers, con-
tinually intrudes itself upon them; and though it does not hinder them from 
conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what is felt by the sufferer, hin-
ders them from conceiving any thing that approaches to the same degree of vio-
lence. . . . These two sentiments, however, may, it is evident, have such a corre-
spondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society. Though 
they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted 
or required. 
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 21-22 (1969). 
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mative utterances—vows, promises, and the like—can be truly ex-
perienced or accomplished through language. Pain as a physical ex-
perience is performed on two levels—the intrapersonal interior and 
the interpersonal anterior—and therefore can be perceived on both 
levels as well, as pain embodied and pain expressed. Thus, the au-
thentic meaning of pain involves a coproduction of meaning, entail-
ing the sufferer’s expression and another’s perception of and re-
sponse to this expression. The difficulties of constructing pain and 
the semantic tensions that inevitably accompany the interpretive act 
only enhance the crucial role these communicative constructions play 
in the human condition and for human connectedness. While the en-
tirety of pain persistently eludes expression, so does ecstatic jubila-
tion or morbid depression. Language exists to express interior states 
such as pain whether or not they have anterior objects. Accordingly, 
pain should not be seen as “that inexpressible something that de-
stroys communication or marks an exit from one’s existence in lan-
guage,” but as that which “makes a claim asking for acknowledg-
ment, which may be given or denied.”58   
 Pain embodied is the seed out of which pain expressed grows; it 
also is its presumed anchor. Pain embodied, however, is not what is 
“real” in an interpersonal sense. The significance of pain embodied 
lies in its presence. Pain expressed, then, bears not only a descriptive 
but also a persuasive function, facilitating knowledge as well as be-
lief.59 This introduces something of a Catch-22; pain embodied is only 
interpersonally realizable through pain expressed, but pain ex-
pressed is an imperfect index of the actuality and nature of pain em-
bodied. That is why the existence of pain involves a coproduction of 
meaning; the expression alone cannot satisfy the inquiry but must be 
supplemented. The recipient must perform interpretive work.  
 Recognizing that pain expressed performs the brunt of the com-
municative legwork has profound ramifications for pain as a social 
construction. As a concept, pain expressed transforms “suffering from 
a static condition—a changeless and thus inherently undramatic 
state of being—into an event . . . enfolded within the context of a lar-
ger, surrounding action.”60 Even in its most tragic incarnations, em-
plotted suffering loses its “debilitating passivity” and “holds the 
promise of cognitive clarifications that may lead to personal or social 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Das, supra note 7, at 70.  
 59. Rey posits that “[t]he very act of proclaiming one’s pain . . . has a direct effect on 
the reality of the experience without our being able to fully determine whether the actual 
expression brings relief by liberating, or perhaps amplifies the feeling through an echoing 
phenomenon.” ROSELYNE REY, THE HISTORY OF PAIN 4-5 (Louise Elliot Wallace et al. 
trans., 1995). 
 60. See MORRIS, ILLNESS, supra note 10, at 207-08. 
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change.”61 Suffering is once more social, “a status that we extend or 
withhold” depending on “whether the sufferer falls within our narra-
tives of moral community.”62  
 While pain embodied satisfies the need to see pain partially as an 
interior, physical experience, pain expressed acknowledges the inter-
dependency of pain and language, the most infamous and highly 
structured expressive medium. Language facilitates corporeal explo-
ration, organizing the ways in which we may know ourselves.63 It 
also plays an essential role in the memory and “recollection” of pain 
and thus in formulating and interpreting pain expressed.64 And, 
paradoxically, expressing pain is the only way to communicate the 
difficulty of its expression.65 As “a message composed, sent, and de-
livered by illness,”66 pain itself even resembles language.67 Certain 
behaviors are associated with suffering, and so pain expressed “al-
ways has a specific language, whether it is a cry, a sob, or a tensing 
of the features.”68 Finally, like language, pain is a product of one’s in-
terior and exterior experiences; “the manner in which pain is ex-
pressed . . . has a direct relation to the way in which pain is actually 
borne and . . . to what is actually felt.”69  
 Although it has spiritual and empathic dimensions, however, we 
cannot forget that pain expressed is also bound up with pain embod-
ied. It is the duality of expression and experience that explains how 
compensating pain constitutes a relief of that pain. While the law 
cannot eliminate pain’s physical roots, it can eliminate a degree of 
the fear and anxiety caused by that pain, in that an award of dam-
                                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 208. 
 62. Id. at 216. 
 63. As Professor Alan Hyde states, “[T]he multiple, competing constructions of the 
body in American law show the impossibility of knowledge of the body unmediated by dis-
course.” ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 6 (1997).  
 64. Of particular import is deconstructing the “symbolic representation of pain; the 
patient uses it to understand his present condition in the light of his past experience and 
what he knows about the pain suffered by others, of his cultural background, and of the so-
cial conventions of his day.” REY, supra note 59, at 335. 
 65. One scholar has even advocated the need for a vocabulary of pain: “[W]e should 
perhaps discuss pain as Eskimos discuss snow, assigning a separate word to each of the 
forms in which snow may be found but dispensing with a single word encompassing all of 
its forms.” Cornelius J. Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medi-
cal Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1356-57 (1974) (citing THOMAS S. SZASZ, PAIN AND 
PLEASURE: A STUDY OF BODILY FEELINGS 10 (1957) (describing the Eskimo system for re-
ferring to snow)). 
 66. MORRIS, CULTURE, supra note 5, at 74.  
 67.  Like language, pain is a “codified form of social behaviour which sets the parame-
ters of allowable overt manifestations and regulates the expression of such innermost per-
sonal experiences” and is “defined by society’s standards of permissiveness or its notions of 
transgression” according to norms that “depend upon the cultural foundations of the socie-
ties in which they arise.” REY, supra note 59, at 4. 
 68. Id. at 4. 
 69. Id. 
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ages is recognition not only that pain is present but also that some-
thing can and should be done to remedy it. Damages may also have 
very material consequences, such as paying for needed medical 
treatment and alleviating financial burdens occasioned by the injury. 
 Thus, pain as a dual construct paves the way for the economic to 
impact upon the physical (and thus mental), so that damages may be 
therapeutic70 even when pain embodied is incurable.71 Seen in this 
light, legal remedies do indeed appear to be alternative forms of heal-
ing, a “psychoactive” therapy that relieves “concurrent emotional 
dysfunctions that may interfere negatively with the perception of 
true physical pain,” such as depression or “neurological fear re-
sponses,”72 by providing the psychological release of knowing that one 
is not suffering alone. As Vertosick remarks, “[T]he source of suffer-
ing lies in humanity, [and] the cure for suffering may be found in our 
humanity as well”; recognizing the communicability of pain and the 
shared nature of suffering illustrates the possibility of companion-
ship and the positive potential of human relations.73 
 Thus, Scarry and Cover stop unnecessarily short of a properly ro-
bust conception of pain. In its most pragmatic, everyday context, pain 
as expressed is what can terminate the physicality of embodied pain 
altogether. Helpless sufferers—whether children suffering from a 
headache or a patient seeking a doctor’s advice concerning an un-
known malady—must first tell another what hurts, how it hurts, and 
perhaps what caused that pain in order to bring an end to their 
physical sufferings. Thus, pain as expressed routinely offers salva-
tion from physical suffering and, by proffering such relief, is certainly 
interpersonally meaningful.   
B.   Evidence for Pain as a Dual Construct 
1.   A Semiotic Analysis of Pain 
 Pain is a matter of interpretation. But to what semantic processes 
do we refer when we say that pain means? How does pain come to 
mean, both personally and interpersonally? Such questions can be 
readily answered through applying a semiotic analysis. In this dis-
cussion, I will discuss the concept of a semiotic sign as formulated by 
both Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Peirce, for it is accepted 
that the Saussurian formulation of the sign is simply a more basic 
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 72. Id. at 263, 268. 
 73. Id. at 270. 
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variant of that developed by Peirce, although the two evolved their 
conceptions of semiotics separately.74  
 A discussion of semiotics, or the study of signs, implicates as well 
semiotic phenomenology, or sign relations in the life world—the 
world as experienced and as engaged in by ourselves, by others, and 
by ourselves with others. Pain arises in the life world not as an ab-
stract entity but as a physical sensation: a twinge, a burn, a tear. It 
is impossible to comprehend the meaning of a sign without simulta-
neously realizing that meaning arises primarily from the relation-
ships between signs, not merely the comprehension of one sign as the 
sum of its individual parts. In this vein, pain as sign is embedded in 
interpretive schemas.75 Once named, painful sensations emerge into 
the life world,76 where “pain re-organises our lived space and time, 
our relations with others and with ourselves.”77    
 The sign, the preeminent semiotic unit of meaning, consists of 
“everything that, on the grounds of a previously established social 
convention, can be taken as something standing for something 
else.”78 According to Saussure, signs consist of a signifier, the compo-
nent of a sign that is visible or somehow ascertainably present, and 
the signified, the component of the sign that is absent but invoked by 
reference.79 Thus, pain expressed would be the signifier because 
words and gestures are ascertainably pregnant with meaning, while 
pain embodied would be the signified—invisible yet invoked through 
pain expressed. Unlike Saussure’s formulation of the sign as dyad, 
Peirce’s conception of the sign consists of a relational triad comprised 
of the representamen (comparable to Saussure’s signifier), the “some-
thing” that “addresses somebody” and “which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity”; the object to which the repre-
sentamen refers; and the interpretant, the “equivalent sign” created 
by the representamen in the mind of the other addressed.80 For Peirce, 
the representamen and the object together form a sign, and it is that 
                                                                                                                     
 74. WENDY LEEDS-HURWITZ, SEMIOTICS AND COMMUNICATION: SIGNS, CODES, 
CULTURES 23 (1993).  
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tions than its inherent qualities.” Mark D. Sullivan, Finding Pain Between Minds and 
Bodies, 17 CLINICAL J. PAIN 146, 151 (2001). 
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sign to which the interpretant refers. In Peirce’s model, pain expressed 
would be the representamen, pain embodied would be the object, and 
another’s understanding of pain as sign would be the interpretant.  
 The inclusion of the interpretant allows Peirce’s triadic model to 
directly account for another’s understanding of an expression. Thus, 
the interpretant paves the way for an understanding of semiotics 
grounded in interpersonal expression. We can then comprehend how 
“a sign relates” and how it comes to have “implications for both social 
relationships and for narrative and other discursive forms.”81 Pain, 
like discourse, is “semiotic activity insofar as the representamens 
give an account (the interpretant) of something for some reason (the 
object) within a community of relevance.”82 
 A sign may have three types of discursively determined relations 
with its object, of which pain expressed evinces two. Pain expressed 
in the form of an artifact such as an x-ray83 can be iconic, being “a 
sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of 
characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether 
any such Object actually exists or not.”84 And as the public meaning 
assigned to a private sensation, such as a throbbing in an infected 
finger, pain expressed can also be indexical, being “a sign which re-
fers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by 
that Object.”85 The final sign-object relationship is that of symbol, an 
arbitrary relationship in which “a sign . . . refers to the Object that it 
denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, 
which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to 
that Object.”86 Objects that become associated with pain or that cause 
pain in a certain instance may be symbolic forms of conveying pain 
expressed—leading us to cower when looking down the barrel of a 
loaded gun or cringe at the sight of a bloody knife. 
 In addition, a sign may have three relationships with its interpre-
tant, all of which constitute different discursive ways of understand-
ing pain. An interpretant can be emotional, “a feeling,”87 as in the 
thrill of an empathic connection that we form with a sufferer; it can 
be energetic, involving effort,88 as in attempts to comprehend the sig-
nificance of an expression of pain; or it can be logical in the sense of 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Kugelmann, supra note 48, at 34.   
 82. Id. at 35. 
 83. See id.  
 84. PEIRCE, supra note 80, at ¶ 247. 
 85. Id. at ¶ 248. 
 86. Id. at ¶ 249. 
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invoking future implications,89 as in gauging how the long-term con-
sequences of an injury may affect an award of damages.  
 Signs themselves, however, are the minimal, not the preeminent, 
units of semiotic meaning. Groupings of signs together with the rules 
for their use constitute sign systems known as codes, which, joined 
into systems, form subcultures and cultures.90 It is through codes 
that signs acquire meaning in the life world. Codes offer ways to “so-
cially construct (produce, maintain, repair, transform) reality”91 and 
“permit[ ] ordered human interaction.”92 Through communication, we 
encode, or engage in semiosis—the active “process of making and us-
ing signs.”93 This is the most profound link between semiotics and the 
social construction of reality; the social becomes constructive not only 
in the sense that codes build meaning, conveying “meaning derived 
from the agreement among and shared cultural experience of their 
users,” but also in that codes themselves are continuously under con-
struction, being “full of gaps and inconsistencies and subject to 
constant change.”94  
 Thus, semiotics not only furthers the concept of pain as a dual 
construct but also strengthens its analytic power. Current medical 
and legal perspectives limit the enunciative possibilities of pain, dis-
torting the public, social nature of pain and rendering the perspec-
tives of researchers such as Scarry and Cover more logical than they 
actually are. Kugelmann laments the fact that pain is subject to the 
same dichotomies—“subjective and objective, mental and physical”—
that pain is subject to in medical terminology.95 Legal conceptualiza-
tions of pain embrace the same dichotomies, in which pain itself is 
“physical” while suffering is “mental” and claims of pain are “subjec-
tive” while medical evidence of pain is “objective.” Although law su-
perficially acknowledges the distinction between physical pain and 
mental suffering, pain and suffering are most often treated as a “uni-
tary concept.”96 This is an implicit recognition that pain is not limited 
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 90. LEEDS-HURWITZ, supra note 74, at 15-17. 
 91. Id. at 15.  
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to the realm of physical sensation and that one must regard mental 
suffering as a form of pain despite its difficulty of proof. By respect-
ing this complexity, law takes an important first step towards under-
standing and applying a semiotic model to pain. According to such a 
model, because pain has interpersonal significance, the semiotics of 
mental suffering must inspire empathy just as the semiotics of physi-
cal pain. To deny the existence of mental suffering would be to ignore 
its interpersonal empathic implications.  
 In illuminating the interpersonal capabilities of pain and the co-
production of meaning, Peirce’s semiotic triad offers the same boons 
to legal understandings of pain as it does to those in critical health 
psychology, “enabl[ing] specification of how a symptom like pain is a 
mode of being-in-the-world with others,” “enabl[ing] us to concen-
trate attention on the actual significance of interpretive schemas 
in praxis,” and “show[ing] the interweaving of culturally defined 
conceptions of the self (as a man, as self-controlled) with ways of 
interpreting pain.”97  
2.   Wittgenstein’s Conceptualization of Pain as a Public Sensation 
 As does semiotic analysis, Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of pain 
emphasizes how pain is not a private sensation but one saturated 
with public meaning. This directly contrasts with Scarry’s concep-
tion, which essentially posits that pain is private due to an “absolute 
split between one’s sense of one’s own reality and the reality of other 
persons.”98 As she conceives of it, expressing pain necessitates the 
“reversing of . . . bodily linings,” “the making of what is originally in-
terior and private into something exterior and sharable” as well as 
the “reabsorption of what is now exterior and sharable into the inti-
mate recesses of individual consciousness.”99 Thus, another way of 
ascertaining whether pain—as embodied and as expressed—
facilitates or hinders the formation of interpersonal relations is to 
ask whether pain is private in an interpersonal sense (as distinct 
from a sufferer’s inability to share its embodied experience with an-
other) or whether, as expressed, it is publicly meaningful.  
 Philosophers have made so-called private language arguments 
when attempting to “carry out a philosophical analysis starting from 
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ment, apprehension, terror or ordeal. 
Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (citing Crisci v. Sec. Ins. 
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 98. SCARRY, supra note 20, at 4. 
 99. Id. at 284. 
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private or personal experiences.”100 Such arguments evolve from the 
perspective that, as Hume states, “ ‘nothing is ever present to the 
mind but perceptions.’ ”101 Following this logic, “we are certain only 
about the existence and nature of our private impressions,” and “[i]f 
individual impressions are the sole basis for philosophical inferences, 
then each person’s language is developed . . . and knowledge is . . . in-
ferred from private impressions and only from these data.”102 Others 
cannot ascertain whether one’s use of the word “pain” follows or de-
parts from their use of “pain,” and so a language composed of refer-
ences to such concepts might “be a private language, comprehensible 
only to its speaker.”103   
 That language itself, and not only sensations, could be private at 
first seems strange, since we have been well-schooled in the proposi-
tion that languages are inherently social constructs that exist to fa-
cilitate interpersonal communication.104 But it is also obvious that 
not everything can be encompassed in or be communicated through 
language—the “silence” of pain being akin to “feelings, intentions, 
ideas, dreams, and even images that are felt, perceived, or experi-
enced by ourselves alone.”105 Incommunicability is an aspect of pain’s 
nature according to Scarry and Cover. And though words referring to 
or describing these personal experiences are comprehensible to oth-
ers, it seems as if the experiences themselves are, indeed, private, ac-
cessible intrapersonally and not interpersonally. Hence, the act of 
translating personal experiences into language seems to withhold or 
eradicate part of their meaning. But how far does the privacy of pain 
extend? Are such experiences entirely private, apart from the sense 
that they arise physically in one body and cannot be shared, like a 
bag of popcorn, with another person? And what about the language 
that we use to express such ostensibly private experiences—is it pri-
vate as well, in the sense that we privately invest meaning in it, di-
minishing others’ ability to apprehend the full import of our sensa-
tion-oriented statements? 
 A number of philosophers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, have 
cultivated arguments to explain why a private language is impossible 
in the process of developing a critique of Cartesian dualism, which 
distinguishes direct and certain knowledge of the “private” contents 
of one’s own mind from the fallible inferential knowledge that it has 
of others’ minds. In other words, Wittgenstein sets out to prove that 
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ostensibly private sensations such as pain are not necessarily private 
at all, save for when they are unexpressed, and that it does not follow 
from the proposition that some (unexpressed) pains are private that 
all pains are private.106 
 In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes a pri-
vate language in the following manner:  “The individual words of this 
language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speak-
ing; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot 
understand the language.”107 Wittgenstein’s refutation of the private 
language argument has specific implications not only for establishing 
pain as a dual construct comprised of pain embodied and expressed 
but also for ascertaining how pain is more public than private. By 
“private,” Wittgenstein is not referring to pain in its instantiation—
whether “each person possesses his own exemplar” of pain—but to 
pain in its actuality, pain as a matter of doubt: “nobody knows 
whether other people also have this or something else.”108 Thus, “pri-
vate” refers to what is known only to one’s self (unshared meaning), 
while “public” refers to what is known or can be made known to oth-
ers (shared or sharable meaning).   
 Wittgenstein begins with the premise that pain is a human trait109 
and that the human self experiences pain, not the body,110 so that the 
proper subject of pain is the suffering person—an early intimation 
that pain is not entirely private.111 Pain thus enables an interper-
sonal connection between the sufferer and another, which that other 
experiences as “pity.”112 Having established that pain is a human 
sensation, Wittgenstein is thus free to explain its role in human rela-
tions as a “public” sensation. Introducing the concept of a “gram-
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mar”113 (a structuring principle comprised of arbitrary rules114 that, 
like languages and language rules, are “social conventions derived 
from, and dependent upon, social practices”),115 he posits that there is 
a “grammar of pain,” or rules for formulating pain-full expressions.116 
Pain, through its grammar, becomes a part of social practice: “ ‘sen-
sation’ is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to 
me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which 
everybody understands.”117 As a part of social practice, pain is interper-
sonally visible; as Wittgenstein claims, “I can exhibit pain, as I exhibit 
red, and as I exhibit straight and crooked and trees and stones.”118     
 But how does pain become part of social practice; “how is the con-
nexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question 
is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the 
names of sensations?—of the word ‘pain’ for example.”119 In other 
words, what is the relationship between a sensation and its expres-
sion? Wittgenstein’s refutation of the private language argument is 
predicated heavily on his understanding of naming processes. Ac-
cording to Wittgenstein, 
[W]ords are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions 
of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself 
and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclama-
tions and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-
behaviour. 
 “So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?”—
On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and 
does not describe it.120 
The proposition that we, as children, learn to substitute words for 
“natural” physical expressions that sensations induce does not nullify 
the physical presence of a sensation such as an itch or tickle in a 
body or undermine the idea that a human being experiences that 
bodily sensation. It does, however, emphasize that the sensation is 
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public in the sense that its meaning and import are public construc-
tions—that its meaning is imposed publicly and not evolved privately.  
 While the public imposition of meaning is demonstrated through 
Wittgenstein’s explanation of the naming process, the relationship of 
the physical sensation to its expression as well as the linguistic foot-
print of that physical sensation are elucidated through the famous 
“beetle in the box” example, designed to demonstrate the absurdity of 
the private language argument: 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “bee-
tle.” No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he 
knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it 
would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in 
his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly chang-
ing.—But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in these people’s 
language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The 
thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even 
as a something: for the box might even be empty.—No, one can ‘di-
vide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
 That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of 
sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops 
out of consideration as irrelevant.121 
 This passage reveals the relationship of the physical sensation to 
its expression; it is readily apparent that this analogy gives credence 
to the idea of pain as a dual construct. The beetle, or sensation, in 
the box, or body, is an interior and unshared experience, while the 
word for that sensation, a different incarnation, is a distinct and 
shared social experience. But the fact that sensation has its locus in 
the body does not mean that it is private, for the meaning of an inte-
rior experience can be externally imposed. Pain expressed is how 
pain embodied enters into the language-game. Other passages from 
Wittgenstein further underscore the distinction between pain embod-
ied and pain expressed by indicating that the former is the founda-
tion for the latter. Wittgenstein acknowledges that “there is some-
thing there accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of that 
that I utter it. And this something is what is important—and fright-
ful.”122 And as he posits in another example, “I tell someone I am in 
pain. His attitude to me will then be that of belief; disbelief; suspi-
cion; and so on. Let us assume [the person told of pain] says: ‘It’s not 
so bad.’—Doesn’t that prove that he believes in something behind the 
outward expression of pain?”123 Significantly, however, pain ex-
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pressed does not insert pain embodied into the language-game in the 
form of a “picture” of pain, but introduces it in some other form.124 
 Regarding the degree to which this example disproves the private 
language argument, one might think that this passage indicates 
Wittgenstein’s belief that “beetles,” or sensations, have no place in 
the language-game.125 As stated previously, he posits that there is no 
private language of sensations, asking us to imagine a language “in 
which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner 
experiences . . . for his private use” in which “[t]he individual words 
. . . are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to 
his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot under-
stand the language.”126 Wittgenstein then attacks the possibility of 
such a private language, stating that if we use words to stand for 
sensations like we ordinarily do, our words for sensations are tied up 
with our natural expressions of sensation and the “language is not a 
‘private’ one.”127 Thus, the example of the beetle in the box stands not 
for the proposition that sensation is irrelevant within the language-
game, but instead points to the absurdity of claiming such sensations 
are private. Sensations must play some part in the language-game 
since we understand them as a part of social practice, intimating 
that they are meaningful. If sensations had “ ‘no place in the lan-
guage-game,’ ” but “drop[ped] out [of consideration] as irrelevant,” 
then “it [would be] impossible to give any account of the actual (that 
is, the ‘public’) use of sensation words,” which “we must, if we are to 
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give an account of that language game,” leading us to “reject the view 
that sensations are private.”128 
 How is it, then, that the notion that sensations such as pain are 
private and not public seems eminently logical? Wittgenstein posits 
that the idea that sensations are private results from confusing the 
grammar of sensation words with that of the grammar of words for 
physical objects through processes of analogy, leading us to think 
that the names of sensations get their names from private, ostensive 
definitions. However, he asserts that because we learn at an early age 
that words replace the natural expressions for sensations, we know that 
the names of sensations are not privately derived but publicly imposed. 
 An illustrative example involves comparing the usages of the 
verbs “to feel” and “to know.”129 If asked “how I know that there is a 
stone in my shoe,” I can answer “ ‘I know [it] because I feel it’ ”; this 
illustrates the perceptual sense of the verb “to feel.”130 Logically, it 
also intimates “that I can know that I am in pain because I can feel 
my pain.”131 But in the sentence “ ‘I feel a slight pain in my knee 
when I bend it,’ ” the verb “to feel” is not being used in its percep-
tual sense because “ ‘I feel’ ” may be replaced by either “ ‘I have’ ” or 
“ ‘there is.’ ”132 Such substitutions are not possible in the sentence “ ‘I 
feel a stone in my shoe’ ”; that sentence does not have the same 
meaning as “ ‘There is a stone in my shoe,’ ” since there could be 
stone in a shoe that the wearer did not feel.133 In addition, “ ‘There 
was a stone in my shoe, but I didn’t feel it’ ” makes sense, whereas 
“ ‘There was a pain in my knee, but I didn’t feel it’ ” does not.134 We 
therefore see that it does not make sense to say “ ‘I know that I am in 
pain because I feel it,’ ” because “sensation words cannot be the ob-
jects of verbs of perception in first-person sentences.”135 Terming 
something a “sensation” implies an awareness that one is experienc-
ing that sensation. Thus, it cannot be said that “ ‘[a]nother person 
can know that I am in pain only if he feels it.’ ”136 “[So] whereas it 
makes sense to speak of ignorance and knowledge, doubt and cer-
tainty, in the case of the stone in the shoe, it does not make sense to 
speak this way in the case of the man in pain. . . . [T]he moves that 
are part of the one language game are not part of the other.”137  
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 All this is to say that, while there are plenty of reasons for those 
who wish to doubt that another is in pain, those reasons emerge not 
from ordinary language usage but from a specialized, philosophical 
usage. Doubting that another is in pain, therefore, requires one to 
switch from a language-game characterized by ordinary usage to a 
philosophical language-game in which usage is twisted, has no real 
meaning, and therefore is solipsistic.138 
 We see “how very queer is the idea that sensations are essentially 
private” when we examine how our fluency in social practice informs 
our knowledge of what behaviors are commonly associated with pain:139  
Could it be that the child who comes crying with a bumped head 
and who screams when it is touched is giving his peculiar expres-
sion to an itching scalp? Or that the giggling child who comes 
wriggling back for more tickling is really a grotesque creature com-
ing back for more pain? . . . No, the idea of the private object is not 
one that turns up in our common thought and practice; it turns up 
only in those odd moments when we are under the influence of a 
false grammatical analogy.140 
 Thus, the conclusion that sensation is publicly meaningful has 
profound implications for the degree to which sensations can be 
interpersonally meaningful. That knowledge of other minds is not, at 
best, inferential and highly dubious, frees our attempts to ascertain 
others’ states from certain failure. Neither pain embodied nor pain 
expressed are necessarily private. Instead, the fact that the expres-
sions can be immediately understood as signifying pain implies that 
there is a shared convention, deeply embedded in linguistic usage, 
that there is an internal and “natural” (in the sense of norm-driven) 
relation between expression and pain. This convention means that 
each instantiation of pain is public: pain embodied in that it is un-
derstood and made meaningfully in public and not private space, and 
pain expressed in that it is a manifestly public acknowledgement of a 
sensation predetermined to be publicly meaningful.  
                                                                                                                     
 138. See WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 106, § 303, at 102. As Wittgen-
stein states,  
“I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am.”—Yes: 
one can make the decision to say “I believe he is in pain” instead of “He is in 
pain.” But that is all.—What looks like an explanation here, or like a statement 
about a mental process, is in truth an exchange of one expression for another 
which, while we are doing philosophy, seems the more appropriate one. 
  Just try—in a real case—to doubt someone else’s fear or pain. 
Id. 
 139. Cook, supra note 128, at 271. 
 140. Id. at 271-72. 
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III.   THE IMPACT OF PAIN AS A DUAL CONSTRUCT ON PERSONAL 
INJURY LITIGATION 
A.   Why Pain as a Dual Construct is an Appropriate Model for 
Personal Injury Litigation 
 As the mechanism for evaluating competing expressions to com-
prehend a particular instance of embodied pain, law is a forum for 
addressing claims of pain, “a domain in which the meanings of pain 
and death are contested, and constituted in the contest.”141 Although 
pain expressed can take both linguistic and metalinguistic forms, 
narrative is the most conscious, precise, rigorous, and objectifying 
medium. It is also the preeminent medium for legal adjudication. 
However else pain is effectively communicated, the law has punished 
plaintiffs who fail to language complaints of pain, even if that failure 
is the result of the plaintiff’s mental condition.142 Finally, consider-
able research, such as Pennington and Hastie’s “story model,” “indi-
cates that jurors typically organize complex evidence into narrative 
form, and that their judgments and the confidence with which they 
hold them depend in part on the ease with which they can generate 
acceptable stories from the data.”143 Under the story model, jurors 
make sense of evidence by ordering it into story form during trial be-
fore learning the legal elements which will guide their verdict; they 
then match the accepted story to the legal elements and determine if 
there is an adequate fit.144  
 If the consequences of pain expressed were destruction and the 
degeneration of interpersonal relations, then it would be difficult in-
deed to justify the purpose or curative potential of the personal in-
jury trial. Law is predicated on the assumption that the physical ex-
perience of pain can somehow be meaningfully expressed in a crea-
tive way. The purpose of the legal institution is to resolve narrative 
claims that bring about changes to the established order that may al-
ter the status quo. Though “chronic pain threatens to unravel the 
self,” in order to successfully pursue a personal injury claim that suf-
fering self must be pulled together through enunciation.145 This en-
tails that pain as a cause of action must be remediable, alterable, and 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Sarat, supra note 6, at 9. 
 142. See, e.g., Soto v. State, 286 N.Y.S.2d 993, 1000-01 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1968) (denying 
pain and suffering claim brought on behalf of a catatonic schizophrenic who died at a state 
mental hospital), rev’d on other grounds, 333 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972). 
 143. NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT 
ACCIDENTS 117 (2001).  
 144. Id.; see generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror De-
cision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 
194-201, 206-09 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (stating that jurors construct stories, learn decision 
alternatives, and match a chosen story to a decision alternative). 
 145. MORRIS, CULTURE, supra note 5, at 73. 
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not static and that the adjudicator to whom pain is expressed must 
see its role as active and not passive, so that a verdict could poten-
tially be an agent of change. Amsterdam and Hertz discuss how at-
torneys in a criminal trial can lead jurors to frame their role as pas-
sive or active decisionmakers through linguistic cues, likely altering 
their verdicts.146 Jurors who assume an active role may “feel empow-
ered to provide the closure that the accident case lacks.”147 This pos-
sibility of revision is not a mere narrative construction but a cultural 
tenet and a foundational assumption of legal culture as well.148 
Predicated on this adjudicatory understanding, a courtroom becomes 
a scene of expressive contestation and negotiation not only because 
there are two competing narratives149 but because adjudicators must 
navigate the differences between muteness and voice, reservation 
and engagement, detachment and investiture, literality and imagina-
tion, dumbness and creativity, and, ultimately, nonrelation and relation. 
B.   The Social Organization of Pain Expressed Within the Personal 
Injury Trial 
 There is an ironic disconnect between legal language and legal 
practice in terms of how the presence of pain is established in a per-
sonal injury trial. While law itself defines pain embodied as its object 
of inquiry, legal practices rely upon pain expressed as the primary 
source of pain-full meaning. The paradoxical narrative construction 
of pain at trial actually proves the viability of pain as a dual con-
struct. Pain embodied—that which is physical and experiential—
must be lifted out of the body and proven through pain expressed. 
Therefore, it is pain expressed that actually generates meaning since 
the asserted meaning of the painful physical experience necessarily 
stands in for the experience itself. Moreover, once the presence of 
pain embodied is established, what is legally meaningful is some-
thing more than its presence: the evolution of that pain, which is 
within the province of pain expressed. It is pain expressed that tells 
                                                                                                                     
 146. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Ar-
guments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55, 75-110 (1992) (examining prosecution and 
defense arguments in a murder trial as dialogic structures). Such techniques include using 
verbs and active metaphors in describing the events leading to the accident and the evi-
dence, using present tense to discuss crucial points in the story, and strategically deploying 
rhetorical questions. FEIGENSON, supra note 143, at 121. 
 147. Id. 
 148. “This belief in the counterfactual is on one level shared by everyone present in the 
courtroom, all of whom, by their participation in a civilization that conducts such trials, 
credit the possibility that this may, in this particular case, be the appropriate legal out-
come.” SCARRY, supra note 20, at 299. 
 149. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 148-49, 164-67 (1999). Burns 
states that the two narratives “become rival suitors for the jury’s imagination” and         
“reflect[ ] an aspect of ordinary moral experience, in which we often construct competing 
narratives.” Id. at 164. 
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much of the liability tale—where that body was located and how it 
now lives in the world as a sufferer. The evolution of embodied pain 
is negotiated through adjudicating the opposing parties’ narratives. 
The competing accounts of pain expressed—told through language, 
image, and metalanguage—are treated as meaningful constructions 
in their own right.150 
 Because pain expressed brings pain embodied into the field of 
public meaning, externalizing it from the suffering body, it attains its 
meaning not through its relationship to the inner world of the suf-
ferer but, as Wittgenstein suggests, through its embeddedness in 
patterns of cultural relation. In order to be publicly meaningful, ex-
pressions must be circumscribed by or embedded within larger cul-
tural patterns, and as a constituent of larger interactive processes, 
pain expressed is part and product of a specific chain of events, in-
terpreted and ordered so as to excite interpersonal empathy. In the 
context of a personal injury trial, in which pain expressed is sup-
posed to facilitate the conclusion that another is liable for pain em-
bodied, pain expressed is socially organized and heavily saturated 
with valuative cues, suffused as it is with subjective bias. Expres-
sions of pain attain the height of desirability in a legal sense when 
the meaning of the pain whose tale they tell is particularly upset-
ting—that is, when it is most culturally undesirable. 
 Because embodied pain is distinct from pain expressed, legal prac-
titioners must establish the justice of an empathic unity with a body 
in pain by constructing pain as a sign in its own right, not as a sen-
sation afflicting the suffering body. In order for pain expressed as 
signifier and pain embodied as signified to be united together as a 
sign, the plaintiff’s body must undergo two different constructive 
processes, achieving a distinct representative effect in each. The exis-
tence of pain embodied must first be successfully established through 
pain expressed. For this to happen, legal practitioners must con-
struct pain expressed as a clinical concept, a “legal diagnosis,” in an 
attempt to divorce the consequences of the pain from the body it af-
flicts so that that pain might attain its own interpersonal reality.151 
In this formulation of pain expressed, the plaintiff’s body becomes an 
interpretive and inspected object, as it might in a doctor’s visit; suf-
fering is only significant is so far as it is a symptom. As this is a 
stage of inquiry, jurors align themselves analytically, not empathi-
                                                                                                                     
 150. In discussing what he refers to as “total justice,” Feigenson states that jurors see 
their duty as being the “balancing” of these competing accounts and conceptualize “doing 
justice as reaching a result that is complete, neat, with no loose ends.”  FEIGENSON, supra 
note 143, at 104.  
 151. Pain embodied can of course be literally alienated from the body by technological 
or physical methods that illuminate invisible internal bodily workings, penetrating the 
skin by techniques such as x-ray images or tissue removal. 
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cally, with the suffering plaintiff. And as in a doctor’s visit, the moral 
obligation to assist the sufferer or to alleviate the pain is temporarily 
suspended; after all, the object of inquiry is a body or body part, and 
as Wittgenstein states, it is the human that suffers.152 
 After pain embodied is established, however, the context changes 
from one of confirmation to compassion. The effect of authenticating 
pain enables it to transcend from an unreachable and inexpressible 
state into one that is interpersonally accessible and subject to rem-
edy or reduction. The focus on the plaintiff’s body now widens to en-
compass not only a body in pain but a person, including not only the 
interpretation of the physical symptoms of pain but also its causation 
and consequences. Thus, pain expressed is again tied back to the suf-
fering body that it afflicts so that it may be “cured” through compen-
sation. This is borne out by legal practice; American Jurisprudence 
advises practitioners “to identify those elements of damages resulting 
from the impairment of the plaintiff’s ability to live a normal life free 
from pain and distress.”153 What constitutes a “normal life” is a 
highly personalized inquiry, underscoring the need to see the plain-
tiff as a person with unique requirements. At this point, having es-
tablished the interpersonal reality of pain, the moral obligation to re-
spond to another’s suffering once again rears its head, and we are 
free to shed analytical indifference and reassume a mantle of com-
passion. Thus, as Peter Brooks argues in a different context, “we can 
think back to, or invent, such unity [of pain and body] only through 
our present consciousness of division . . . .”154 
 Pain expressed, then, creates value in the process of creating 
meaning and thus necessarily fosters the evolution of identity—
positioning and repositioning as interdependent and interactional ac-
tors the sufferer, the agent of suffering, and the trier of fact. In this 
respect, it is identical to other means of self-expression that are used 
in everyday social milieus to create or sustain social and moral value. 
Law itself is a value-allocating enterprise; courtrooms are venues 
where identity is on trial because parties are unwilling to fulfill as-
signed roles. Such expressions construct the moral identity of their 
authors, shaping an image of a worthy and acceptable individual 
whose interior state, though pain-full, is stable and coherent but 
                                                                                                                     
 152. For a description of the analytical stance taken by the doctor in a diagnostic ap-
pointment, see Christian Heath, Pain Talk: The Expression of Suffering in the Medical 
Consultation, 52 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 116, 119 (1989). As Heath states, “[T]he practitioner’s 
analytic orientation towards the suffering of the patient, and her license to inflict pain and 
to remain insensitive to the other’s discomfort is strictly embedded within the accomplish-
ment of [professional] diagnostic activity and in her professional obligation to assess and 
treat illness and disability.” Id. at 119. 
 153. Jack H. Olender, Showing Pain and Suffering, in 5 AM. JUR. TRIALS 921, § 31 
(1966). 
 154. PETER BROOKS, BODY WORK: OBJECTS OF DESIRE IN MODERN NARRATIVE 5 (1993). 
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helpless and who accordingly must seek aid in combating against 
earlier undeserved injuries and ongoing suffering. Similarly, pain 
expressed seeks to position the trier of fact as a potential care pro-
vider who can “cure” pain embodied by recognizing and compensating it.  
C.   How Pain Expressed Works Through Narrative 
 The conclusion that pain expressed is a distinct form of pain com-
pels us to consider its expressive processes, how representation oc-
curs through language. As we have seen, pain is an inherently com-
municative subject matter; it not only invites interpretation, it man-
dates an explanation. Law adjudicates the existence of embodied 
pain through an inquiry into the plaintiff’s credibility.155 Within this 
inquiry, truth and authenticity must be established in large part 
through narrative, along with other verbal and nonverbal modes of 
expression. In personal injury trials, it is pain embodied that is the 
basis for bringing suit, but it is pain expressed that wins those suits. 
Each construction of pain in this context is a subjective expression; 
even medical evidence has a latent meaning that must be made 
manifest to an audience. Thus, narrative and other expressive medi-
ums are the origins of meaning-making in the personal injury trial.156  
 What makes a narrative resonate with its audience? Comprehen-
sible narratives exhibit continuity, which is created through tempo-
ral junctures between clauses that must be conveyed in a particular 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Corpus Jurus Secundum notes that “the existence of compensable physical pain is 
an issue of credibility and the jury must believe that plaintiff suffered physical pain before 
it compensates him or her for such pain.” 25 C.J.S. Damages § 92 (2002). 
 156. This is not a novel statement. Storytelling certainly plays a role in the construc-
tion of identities on all levels of social organization. In making sense of our own experi-
ences, which we must do before we relate such accounts to others, “[w]e tell stories to de-
scribe ourselves not only so others can understand who we are but also so we can under-
stand ourselves.” ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: A NEW LOOK AT REAL AND 
ARTIFICIAL MEMORY 44 (1990). Constructing a narrative around a fragmentary series of 
experiences and impressions vivifies their actuality. As Schank notes, “It’s as if nothing 
has happened until an event is made explicit in language.” Id. at 114. If there is no one 
else with whom to share a narrative, we are likely to develop one for ourselves, perhaps in 
anticipation of telling others at some future point. Id. at 117. We may even construct nar-
ratives prior to deciding upon a course of action, in order to make decisions that seem ra-
tional and justified. Id. at 160. Consequently, “people have difficulty making decisions if 
they know that they will have trouble constructing a coherent story to explain their deci-
sion.” Id. at 159. Narratives are part of social practice and are inherently relational, ena-
bling meaningful interaction. PAUL CONNERTON, HOW SOCIETIES REMEMBER 21 (1989) 
(stating that “we all come to know each other by asking for accounts, by giving accounts, by 
believing or disbelieving stories about each other’s pasts and identities. . . . The narrative 
of one life is part of an interconnecting set of narratives; it is embedded in the story of 
those groups from which individuals derive their identity.”). Such accounts help us to 
evolve social contexts for ourselves and others in life histories situated within a “history of 
. . .  social settings.” Id. 
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order to make sense.157 Narrative continuity establishes narrative lu-
cidity and credibility—and practitioners’ texts warn lawyers that 
these elements are established very quickly.158 Pragmatically, narra-
tive continuity not only confirms that a life is progressing and chang-
ing but helps to explain those changes. Such developments take on 
special significance in the transition between what came before and 
what is to come, the fulcrum of which is found in life’s turning 
points—moments that usher in new life directions, for better or for 
worse. The goal of a legal construction of pain expressed is not only 
to make real the presence of pain but also to chronicle it (as in a pain 
diary)159 by effectively organizing these turning points so as to render 
comprehensible in a cause-and-effect sense the series of mishaps in 
which it arose. Effective organization is essential to the cause and 
thus to the establishment of pain embodied; as Corpus Juris Secun-
dum states, “although a person may suffer pain which he or she at-
tributes to a cause, this belief, however well-founded in his or her 
mind, is not the cause until it finds acceptance in the minds of the 
trier of fact.”160 Narrative continuity, then, is a thread connecting a 
series of pins, or turning points, in a meaningful order. A narrative 
resolution is merely a sensible arrangement of events around such 
turning points, what Henry James refers to as the “distribution at 
the last of prizes, pensions, husbands, wives, babies, millions, ap-
pended paragraphs, and cheerful remarks.”161   
 Pain-full events in which a body is injured, together with the cir-
cumstances which initiate that pain, are undeniably narrative turn-
ing points.162 Narrative lends the structure and reflects the shared ef-
                                                                                                                     
 157. WILLIAM LABOV & DAVID FANSHEL, THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE: PSYCHOTHERAPY AS 
CONVERSATION 109 (1977). Justin Lewis refers to this particular feature of narrative as its 
“code of sequence” and states that “part of the storyteller’s skill is the use of the code of se-
quence to control and direct that growth [of ideas, themes, or characters in our conscious-
ness].” Justin Lewis, The Absence of Narrative: Boredom and the Residual Power of Televi-
sion News, 4 J. NARRATIVE & LIFE HIST. 25, 27 (1994). 
 158. Legal skills publications place storytelling high on the list of priorities in jury tri-
als, for if a narrative is not supplied for them, “jurors will begin a mental search for a story 
they know that fits the first facts they hear. . . . Once they have found a story that matches 
up with what they have heard, they will stop listening . . . .” Rodney Jew, Tell It to the 
Jury: The Role of Storytelling in Litigation, in 2 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE 
MATERIALS 1407, Part III (2003). 
 159. Pain diaries are considered to be part of the plaintiff’s medical record and most of-
ten fall into the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnoses 
or treatment. See, e.g., Reed v. Abrahamson, 423 S.E.2d 491, 495 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) 
(finding that a pain diary was not inadmissible hearsay but a part of the plaintiff’s medical 
record admissible under the Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) hearsay exception for Statements for 
Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment). 
 160. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 310 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 161. HENRY JAMES, Art of Fiction, in LITERARY CRITICISM: VOLUME I 44, 48 (1984).   
 162. According to Austin Sarat, “The history of narrative is, in part, a record of the way 
humans respond to the violence and pain that can threaten to tear down our carefully con-
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fort that is needed to hold on to meaning in the face of suffering. Pain 
and suffering in turn advance narrative, summoning forth “the re-
lated processes of moral reflection and of personal change” that en-
able a “becoming.”163 Pain-full narratives are thus “compelling sto-
ries,” stories that “we seek . . . and as lawyers become involved in and 
must learn to tell . . . because we are pushed, shoved, and dragged 
into an unfolding future that can be claimed only as we confront ob-
stacles and endure arduous struggles.”164 Narrative continuity and 
coherence is essential for others to make sense of pain and suffering; 
research suggests that it is the internal structure of a story that peo-
ple credit, not its correspondence to external evidence; “the more am-
biguities and gaps at crucial junctures, the less credible the story 
is.”165 Moreover, narrative form assists jurors in “feel[ing] right about 
their decisions,” producing the sense of “emotional completion and 
satisfaction provided by a well-resolved story.”166  
 Such completeness and satisfaction are likely realized by portray-
ing the contest between the plaintiff and the defendant in melodra-
matic terms. Successful personal injury narratives often incorporate 
aspects of melodrama—in which human agency is the cause of 
events, in which actions are derived from character traits, and in 
which there is a polarization of good and evil.167 A melodramatic 
characterization not only explains behavior and simplifies its causes 
and complications, but it also focuses upon victims and their suffer-
ing, focusing the jurors’ emotional participation upon the plaintiff 
and portraying the victim as someone who needs a hero (that is, the 
jury) to “win.”168 This is not to say that a melodramatic characteriza-
                                                                                                                     
structed but fragile webs of signification and structures of meaning.” AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN 
THE STATE KILLS 161 (2001). 
 163. As Morris states,  
This moral process of “becoming” applies both to the teller and to the listener. 
Telling the stories of their illness constitutes a moral action by which the ill 
negotiate the reshaping of their own lives. Listening to such stories and re-
sponding to them with empathy constitutes for the listener an equally impor-
tant moral act that also contains a possibility for significant life changes. 
MORRIS, ILLNESS, supra note 5, at 257 (discussing ARTHUR W. FRANK, THE WOUNDED 
STORYTELLER: BODY, ILLNESS, AND ETHICS (1995)). 
 164. See Elkins, supra note 16, at 827. 
 165. FEIGENSON, supra note 143, at 117 (citing W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. 
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981)). 
 166. Id. at 106 (emphasis omitted). 
 167. Feigenson defines melodrama as  
a narrative in which (a) events, such as accidents, are caused by individual 
human agency; (b) the acts of individuals are explicable in terms of their char-
acters; (c) the agents involved in the accident can be divided into “good guys” 
and “bad guys”; (d) the focus of the narrative is the accident victim and his or 
her suffering; and (e) the good guy wins (at trial) and the bad guy gets his or 
her comeuppance. 
Id. at 89.  
 168. Id. at 90. 
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tion is always imposed or that it even is especially likely to bring 
about the happy ending in which the “good guy” is victorious; advo-
cacy is constrained by rules governing procedure and evidentiary 
presentation, which limits “the range of both the emotions likely to 
be evoked and the plot devices available for evoking them.”169 How-
ever, the use of melodrama does not thwart the rule of law in the 
sense that drama endangers reason, for “[t]he dramatic form of the 
trial deepens the general tension between involvement and distance” 
in that it “allows for some sympathetic identification with those as-
pects of common sense invoked . . . by each lawyer, while distancing 
the audience from each vision, in order to allow some limited tran-
scendence of commonsense judgment.”170 Research conducted by Neal 
Feigenson in a mock trial setting suggested that jurors in compara-
tive negligence cases have no difficulty apportioning fault and the 
presence of melodrama does not significantly affect jurors’ appor-
tionments of fault or damage awards.171 The melodramatic charac-
terization is useful, however, because it evokes a system of roles that 
is likely part and parcel of jurors’ social and cultural schemas. 
 Acts of legal adjudication—events which force the choice between 
two narratives of turning points—are also themselves potential turn-
ing points, forcing resolution of a legal conflict.172 Legally successful 
narratives make law and thus affirmatively embed a particular con-
struction of the parties involved and of the broader community. 
Hence, in the act of adjudication, “[a] juror’s decision between com-
peting narratives is . . . a definition of public identity. Because he is tak-
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 91. An experiment conducted by Neil Feigenson and others that exposed 
participants to a variety of scenarios, manipulating the severity of the scenario outcome 
and the degree of the plaintiff’s culpability, revealed that mock jurors were more emotion-
ally involved with plaintiffs when only one party was highly blameworthy (and attribu-
tions of blame were unambiguous) even though the plaintiff himself might have been the 
culpable party, leading Feigenson to conclude that mock jurors’ emotive responses were 
both simplified and dichotomized. Id. at 94. This suggests “that jurors respond emotionally 
to accident cases as if they expect accidents to take melodramatic form”—in other words, 
that expected narrative form primes emotive responses. Id. at 94-95 (emphasis omitted). 
See also Neal Feigenson et al., The Role of Emotions in Comparative Negligence Judg-
ments, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 576 (2001) (detailing the methodology and the results 
of the experiment).  
 170. BURNS, supra note 149, at 138. 
 171. See FEIGENSON, supra note 143, at 97. 
 172. Indeed, practitioners are advised to plan their legal narratives around the idea of 
a conflict. An Association of Trial Lawyers of America publication on advocacy skills in-
structs members of the bar that  
[t]he start of your story should involve such a conflict—a change, decision, or 
dispute. It should raise a question in jurors’ minds that leads them on a path to 
the desired juror takeaway . . . . The ending of the story should resolve the con-
flict and answer the question raised for jurors in the opening scene. 
Jew, supra note 158, at Part IV. 
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ing public action through public institutions, his judgment is inevitably 
determination, in a strong sense, of the nature of his community.”173  
D.   Interpretive Dimensions of Pain Expressed 
 As a narrative, pain expressed in a legal forum must perform 
three tasks: it must establish the existence of embodied pain in its 
own right, it must connect the existence of that embodied pain to a 
believable chronicle of events involving the suffering body, and it 
must position the sufferer as a sentimentalized body and the trier of 
fact as a potential care provider.  
1.   Pain Expressed, the Body, and Desire 
 Expressive constructions of pain inevitably invoke the body. It is 
not a new proposition to suggest that bodies, their actions, and their 
reactions are always at the heart of legal narratives. Nor is it novel 
to suggest that effective legal interpretations act upon bodies, con-
structing them and directing them in the enunciation of legal judg-
ments. Narrative continuity itself demands that bodies be positioned 
and repositioned. As the central characters in criminal legal narra-
tives, for instance, bodies maintain an inherently unstable position 
between two asserted extremes of guilt and innocence, culpability 
and nonculpability. Similarly, pain expressed creates and seeds new 
bodily identity; that is, it is a “sign imprint[ing] the body, making it 
part of the signifying process.”174  
 Legal expressions of pain invoke not one but three bodies. As a 
matter of course, such expressions refer to the body that is presently 
suffering the pain. In order to effectively construct pain expressed, 
however, it is necessary to invoke the specters of two other bodies as 
well: the preinjury body and the posttrial body, whose pain is dimin-
ished at least symbolically through recognition and compensation. 
These ghosts—of pain past, present, and future—weave themselves in 
and out of legal narratives of pain, trailing with them the sadness of a 
past beyond reach and the hope of a future which may yet be attained. 
 As it is in other interpersonal contexts, pain expressed is an at-
tempt to arouse the natural human desire to know the body in an in-
timate but not in an overtly erotic sense, to not only recognize it as 
the bearer of signs but to penetrate beneath those signs. We appreci-
ate the profundity of imaginatively stepping into another’s shoes, 
particularly when that person is in a uniquely desirable or deplorable 
position; this anticipation is akin to the “pleasure of flinching” at a 
                                                                                                                     
 173. BURNS, supra note 149, at 173. 
 174. BROOKS, supra note 154, at 3. 
80  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:41 
 
painful image.175 In a strange twist for the ever-smiling American 
culture, “[p]eople want to weep. Pathos, in the form of a narrative, 
does not wear out.”176 This drive to empathize is seen in the popular-
ity of media which delves beneath the skins of its characters; 
“stor[ies] of success or failure in gaining access to the body—and the 
story of the fulfillment or disillusionment that this brings”—mirror 
attempts in our own life to “pierce the mysteries of life that are so of-
ten subsumed for us in the otherness of other people.”177 Acknowledg-
ing this desire even privately makes one feel silly, sullied, or shame-
ful. But it is none of these. 
 Sontag writes how the erotic theorist Georges Bataille kept on his 
desk a photograph taken in China in 1910 of a tortured prisoner un-
dergoing the death of a thousand cuts, and she notes that for Bataille 
looking at the photo was both a “mortification of the feelings and a 
liberation of tabooed erotic knowledge.”178 It is a form of intimacy to 
have the power to empathically reach out to others and to act on the 
basis of that empathy. Though such connections are certainly capable 
of invoking darker sensations and longings, there is something mani-
festly redeeming in establishing a connection with others, something 
enervating and hopeful.179 
 The attraction of the empathic connection, the trigger of desire, is 
difference. The power of pain expressed lives in its ability to enunci-
ate a “sentimentalized body,” which is simultaneously a sign of dif-
ference and a summons of empathy.180 A body in pain is by its nature 
a different body, distinct from a population that by and large does 
not suffer from pain, and yet a body that because of the horrible rea-
son for its difference invites others to attempt to recognize and com-
prehend that pain. The sentimentalized body thus sparks pangs of 
empathy, allowing pain expressed to temporarily overcome interper-
sonal discontinuities.  
 But heralding the existence of an empathic connection and trum-
peting its meaning ultimately repositions the bodies involved. Articu-
lating pain’s dimensions necessarily repositions the sufferer; it is dif-
                                                                                                                     
 175. SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 41 (2003). 
 176. Id. at 83. 
 177. BROOKS, supra note 154, at 8. 
 178. SONTAG, supra note 175, at 98. As Sontag notes,  
Suffering [is] something more than just suffering, [it is] a kind of transfigura-
tion. It is a view of suffering, of the pain of others, that is rooted in religious 
thinking, which links pain to sacrifice, sacrifice to exaltation—a view that 
could not be more alien to a modern sensibility, which regards suffering as 
something that is a mistake or an accident or a crime. Something to be fixed. 
Something to be refused. Something that makes one feel powerless. 
Id. at 99. 
 179. Id. at 99. 
 180. HYDE, supra note 63, at 192-93. 
2006]                         RECOGNIZING ODYSSEUS’ SCAR 81 
 
ficult to say that we are subject to pain when pain itself is one’s sub-
ject. Expressing pain, then, moves one from passive suffering to ac-
tive lamenting and onwards. Similarly, if suffering has the potential 
to destroy, then those who respond to it have the power to create and 
to cure, repositioning responders as potential caregivers and suffer-
ers as the objects of care. 
 Law is certainly not a stranger to such empathic positionings or, 
for that matter, to emotion in general. As Martha Nussbaum con-
cludes, it is impossible to have law without emotion since the ration-
ales behind many legal practices take emotion into account and since 
our need for law itself is predicated on our “vulnerab[ility] to harm 
and damage” and thus on the emotions by which we respond to those 
vulnerabilities.181 Thus, the expression of pain “provides a bridge be-
tween the body constructed in legal discourse and others standing, at 
least for a moment, beyond the reach of law” and therefore “figures 
prominently as a device through which law builds solidarity.”182  
 Hence, when pain is on trial, desire is on trial as well. Legal pro-
ceedings in which constructions of pain enable the alleviation or 
compensation of that pain thus end in a very real human pleasure, 
and not just for the plaintiff. This pleasure is all the more real be-
cause jurors are invited to involve themselves in the act of represen-
tation and not merely to spectate. Plaintiffs thus place jurors in a 
very particular position. Jurors know of their role within the court 
forum where claims of pain and suffering will be heard and judged. 
They know that within that forum there awaits a person who claims 
to be suffering. Confronted with both a narrative of pain expressed 
and an image of the one who suffers, jurors can and must craft their 
own representations, choosing the ending they feel is most fitting to 
this particular story.  
2.   Pain Expressed, the Body, and Moral Authority 
 The moral authority of pain expressed comes from the manner in 
which it positions the sufferer and the person to whom suffering is 
expressed in an interactional dyad. Pain expressed focuses empathic 
attention more on the self than on the body; it “seems more to refer 
to the subject while pain seems more the objectification of this suffer-
ing.”183 According to Wittgenstein, it is the suffering individual, and 
not his pain or the pain-full body part, that confronts us, inducing an 
interpersonal reaction. As such, the empathic reaction engendered by 
pain expressed is an ethical response, a consequence of effective nar-
                                                                                                                     
 181. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 6 
(2004).  
 182. Sarat, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing HYDE, supra note 63). 
 183. REY, supra note 59, at 3. 
82  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:41 
 
rative positioning, enabling interpersonal communion, the joining of 
a healthy body with a body in pain. This empathy allows us to ago-
nize over pain that is experienced by others, to compare it to pain 
that we ourselves experienced in the past or believe we will experi-
ence in the future, to become captivated, horrified, and haunted by 
artistic representations of pain. Pain expressed renders another’s ag-
ony empathically appreciable and thus part of the human condition, 
connecting us one to another.184 But this bridge between self and 
other is also profusely “moral.”185 To not suffer, to not be pained by 
the pain of others, would be the reaction of a “moral monster.”186 
These moral dimensions are what prompted C.S. Lewis to note in 
The Problem of Pain that pain is the means by which God calls hu-
mans to him, so that pain becomes a “Divine Megaphone” summon-
ing us to spiritual attention. To continue this metaphor, pain ex-
pressed and the public meaning that it imputes constitutes the prick 
that wakes us to the presence and needs of others—and inevitably to 
the hope that is to be found in that interpersonal awareness.  
 The moralities of this interactional positioning are made possible 
in the first place by emplotting pain in the body, which in turn neces-
sitates charting its anterior origins, including establishing its au-
thenticity. In addition, the counterpart to bodily constructions of 
identity is the process of verifying that these identities are accurate 
and therefore legitimate. As a forum for evaluating two competing 
constructions of pain expressed, a personal injury trial is a means of 
assessing a body’s identity, of ascertaining who is a legitimate plain-
tiff, of recognizing the legitimate sufferer as Odysseus was recog-
nized by his scar.  
 Truth is thus a central concern of legal adjudication in personal 
injury litigation. Concern for truth is natural; suffering is only mean-
ingful when we may ascertain for ourselves that it is genuine. The 
authenticity required of expressions of pain in a personal injury trial 
parallel the moral authority demanded of photographic representa-
tions of suffering187—frozen images of the very same linguistic and 
metalinguistic cues that assist jurors to evaluate visual evidence of 
suffering. Bodies necessarily belong in photographs, as they do in 
law, because their characteristics both cry out for understanding and 
boundary the understandings that evolve. In both representational 
forums, pain as expressed must be accompanied by actual embodied 
pain; the difference between the two contexts is that the sufferer as-
serting pain expressed must prove the physical pain at trial, whereas 
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photographic depictions of pain are taken to be authentic until they 
are proven false. Viewers hate to be betrayed by images; our experi-
ence of viewing is wounded when, for example, we realize that “many 
of the canonical images of early war photography turn out to have 
been staged, or to have had their subjects tampered with.”188 The 
thrill of connecting with another’s suffering is diminished by the dis-
covery that the image was posed, that the suffering is an illusion. 
Our pleasure in such images vanishes when we learn that they were 
composed precisely to exploit that pleasure.189 Instead, we demand an 
authentic witness; “we want the photographer to be a spy in the 
house of love and of death, and those being photographed to be un-
aware of the camera.”190 Only authentic, unposed, unstrategized im-
ages carry moral authority.191 
 Thus, the adversarial narratives whose merit is litigated in court 
must rely upon the body to establish the authenticity of pain embod-
ied and the credibility of pain expressed. In so doing, advocates not 
only assign meaning to a past event, but necessarily construct “a spe-
cifically moral meaning.”192 Because even medical evidence of pain 
embodied attains lay significance only through an explanation of 
what it is and how it is pain-full, pain expressed becomes the vehicle 
for pain embodied. A persuasive legal narrative of pain expressed is 
the preface to all other legal determinations. If an adjudicator is per-
suaded that pain embodied is present, then it may move on to con-
sider whether the incident in which the plaintiff claims to have in-
curred the pain is legally actionable, whether the pain is com-
pensable, and who, if anyone, is liable. In a successful personal in-
jury suit, pain expressed is equated with pain embodied; signifier 
and signified unite to form the sign. Conversely, if the adjudicator 
determines that the plaintiff is a malingerer and that consequently 
there is only a pretense of pain embodied, then there is no basis for 
compensation and the requisite chain of events to establish liability 
need never be set in motion. 
3.   The Interpretive Consequences of Pain Expressed 
 A jury verdict for or against the plaintiff is not merely a series of 
words, but a judgment, a speech act “remaking reality by so ordering 
it,” “placing bodies on one side or the other of the line.”193 Construct-
ing as they do two pain-full realities—the bodily impact of interior 
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sensations upon anterior reality—legal expressions of pain are crea-
tive attempts to “make the body mean” at a time when crisis renders 
semantic potential essential so as to ensure that a suffering body is 
not lost to meaning altogether.194 Essentially, then, a successful nar-
rative of pain is, in Barthes’ words, a striptease “which works toward 
a progressive solution of preliminary enigmas, toward a full predic-
tion of the narrative ‘sentence,’ toward a plenitude of meaning.”195 
Pain is provocative; as in the striptease, the desire to reach the end is 
the desire to see truth unveiled.  
 Ultimately, litigation—a narrative occupation—is also a creative 
one, as it seeks to author a new narrative, to effect change in the 
status quo in accordance with precedent. As emplotted stages of a 
narrative in pursuit of progression, the processes of gauging the ac-
tuality of pain, feeling for the sufferer, and ultimately compensating 
pain fulfill the human desire to do something and not remain inert 
and unmoved. Thus, “[t]rials are one of the ways in which we deter-
mine and perform our story of justice,” and “[t]he structured telling 
and contesting of stories that takes place in trials . . . and that lies at 
the heart of law is an ongoing performance of our story of justice.”196 
Expressions of pain, playing as they do a crucial role in the formation 
of new legal narratives, therefore fulfill an important sociolegal out-
let in that they “provide[ ] a vehicle of law’s renewal and regeneration 
since it is in stories that the aspiration to justice is maintained and 
revitalized in narrative.”197  
 This, of course, heavily impacts legal hermeneutics because 
“[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”198 Le-
gal interpretation in the context of personal injury litigation is ex-
plicitly designed to recognize and compensate credible allegations of 
pain caused by actual deeds of violence (even if those deeds were un-
intentional) in an effective way.199  While triers of fact do not have 
the authority to impose pain and suffering directly in the context of 
personal injury trials as they do when allocating criminal sanctions, 
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they do have the authority to recognize pain and suffering as such, to 
hold that pain and suffering were wrongly forced upon a plaintiff in a 
legally cognizable and compensable sense, and to compensate that 
plaintiff accordingly. By holding pain and suffering compensable, an 
adjudicator in effect states that the conduct which produced the pain 
and suffering is unjustified and impermissible and thus cannot be 
condoned. Similarly, by failing to find alleged pain and suffering on 
the basis that it could not be credibly established, an adjudicator 
commits a form of violence upon the person of the plaintiff in denying 
the pain that she claims to embody. If the trier of fact mistakes an 
authentic sufferer for an inauthentic sufferer, however, such a denial 
of pain effectively silences an attempted expression of a seemingly 
inexpressible force and thereby becomes a denial of feeling and hu-
man worth as well. Moreover, this denial of pain is a manifestly pub-
lic denial and serves to label the plaintiff as a malingerer or liar, a 
moral incompetent unworthy of trust or one willing to violate moral 
strictures for the prospect of economic gain. The adjudicator does not 
perceive such a determination as violence, however, since for him 
there is no pain, and without pain there seemingly is no violence 
perpetrated by the trier of fact who announces a verdict for the defen-
dant. In this way, “[t]he judicial word is a mandate for the deeds of oth-
ers.”200  
IV.   CREATING PAIN-FULL COMPREHENSION THROUGH SOCIAL 
PRACTICE 
A.   Expression, Imagination, and Adjudication 
 With an understanding of how a pain-full reality is grounded in 
and constructed by social practice, we may now consider more pre-
cisely the processes whereby pain expressed conveys interpersonal 
understanding of pain. How exactly is a jury persuaded to believe one 
party’s narrative over that of the opposing party? How does legal 
practice transform pain expressed into empathic realization of an-
other’s pain that may trigger compensation, an activation of the pas-
sive wish to banish suffering? 
 Answering these queries necessitates that we reconsider Scarry’s 
assertion that, to the extent that it can be expressed, interpersonal 
understanding of pain is conveyed by imagination. This insight, 
though a critical contribution to the evolution of pain scholarship, 
can be greatly furthered by acknowledging that the communication 
of pain is not a particularly imaginative process, for that would inti-
mate that pain itself is private and rooted in inner imaginative ex-
perience. Instead, the meaning of pain—and thus its expression—is 
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grounded in publicly negotiated and imposed meaning, in social prac-
tice. Crucially, acknowledging the role of social context also naturally 
accounts for the formation of empathic engagement. To contextualize 
this new issue in terms of the prior discussion, we are now address-
ing by what processes pain expressed fosters the creation of pain as a 
sign, how the relationship between pain embodied and pain ex-
pressed is exploited or made meaningful through social practice.  
1.   Imagination 
 Imagination, according to Scarry, constitutes a substitute for ex-
perience, allowing jurors, who were not privy to the occasion of in-
jury, to resolve a narrative conflict, permitting self-extension into 
other realms but not through the experiential sentience upon which 
such engagement is ordinarily premised.201 Lawyers then become 
“imagineers,” to borrow a term from Disney, helping us to construct 
the external world and enunciate its boundaries.  
 According to Scarry, “[P]ain and the imagination are each other’s 
missing intentional counterpart”;202 on the one hand we have pain, 
the ultimate suffusion of feeling; on the other, imagination, a con-
frontation with a feeling or sensation that one is unable to experien-
tially access and which it cannot feel. And what imagination creates, 
pain destroys. Imagination, then, grants access to impalpable pain. 
2.   Reconceptualizing Imagination as Expression-Induced Empathy 
 Stepping back from Scarry’s commentary on imaginative proc-
esses, we see that other constitutive processes precede the imagina-
tion, necessitating that we recognize what lies before and beyond 
imagination if we are to realize fully how pain is constructed and 
structured. Pain is not only a matter of or for the imagination. Both 
the intrapersonal and interpersonal meaning of pain are publicly de-
rived. In fact, pain is accessible through the imagination only after it 
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is accessible through social practice. Pain creates the need for lan-
guage, but language creates “pain.” To grasp the impropriety of rely-
ing on imagination alone, we must account for the gap between the 
imagining of pain that establishes its presence and the expression-
induced empathy that prompts one to progress from imagining to in-
terpersonal engagement and, eventually, response. As we shall see, 
to transition from one to the other requires the vehicle of social practice. 
 (a) How Pain is Different from Other Imaginings 
 In considering the relationship of pain to imagination, it is readily 
apparent that the imagining of pain is different from other imagin-
ings in that we accord it a type of material reality. Unless we suffer 
from anihidrosis,203 we come to know pain from experiencing it. Pain 
can be myth, but not mythic; its experience can be legendary, but not 
merely a legend. In addition, in order for something to be imaginable 
as pain, it must find some link in our repertoire of direct and indirect 
experience. We imagine pain knowing that our imaginings might be-
come tangible at any time; we realize through shared cultural knowl-
edge that we may soon have to apply our pain-full imaginings to the 
material realities of our own experience or to that of another. Our 
ability to imagine pain is an evolved coping mechanism, allowing us 
to play with “what if” before the “if” becomes “is.” This is similar to 
our imaginings of death; we know that we must experience it one day 
and likely know others who have.  Thus we imagine it fearfully, realiz-
ing that we know not when it will become real for us or our loved ones.  
 This potential to “become real” at any time necessitates a different 
correspondence between fiction and fact. To illustrate, we know that 
unicorns are creatures of fairy tale and we know that no serious 
adult is going to ask us to find one because we know from our social 
practice that unicorns do not actually exist. In contrast, though we 
may not have encountered the pain of being in a car hit by a tractor 
trailer, such experiences are part of our social practice in that we see 
such accidents on the road or watch reports of them on the evening 
news. Through such experiences we realize that we or someone we 
know could be involved in them, inviting us to place ourselves in the 
bandages of one who has. Thus, we accord this tragic experience a 
reality that we do not grant to the unicorn, since there but for the 
grace of God go we. As Nussbaum states, “[C]ompassion typically in-
volves the thought that we ourselves are vulnerable in similar ways,” 
thereby “connect[ing] the suffering person to the sympathizer’s own 
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possibilities and vulnerabilities.”204 Finally, the imagining of pain is 
also different in that when we place ourselves in a sufferer’s shoes, 
we attempt to access not an image but an experience and aspire to 
connect to the physical through the expressionistic. This reverses the 
communicable relation of pain expressed to pain embodied in which 
the expressionistic allows us to connect to the physical. 
 (b)   What Imagination Lacks 
 Because pain, unlike other imaginings, resounds in our social 
practice, imagination alone is ill-equipped to handle it. As the fanci-
ful connotations of “imaginary” imply, imagination is not necessarily 
anchored in social practice or the life world. The power of imagina-
tion lies in the fact that it expands the horizons of our conscious 
awareness, enabling us to apprehend so much more than is apparent 
from our immediate experience. In addition, imagination, by its na-
ture, is ungrounded; there is no requirement that our imaginings be 
tethered to any asserted reality. Thus, as in expressing pain, there is 
always a profound gap between our ability to imagine and our ability 
to reconstruct what is imagined for another. Language hampers our 
ability to communicate to another exactly what we are imagining and 
so we must be satisfied with approximation. Therefore, imagina-
tion—like language—is incomplete. We cannot separate imagination 
into imagination embodied and imagination expressed because the 
very nature of an imaginary construct means that it is disembodied. 
Thus we need something to tie our imaginings into a specific context, 
to boundary them in some way so that we may determine whether an 
imagined construction is reasonable or appropriate—the critical 
question in the personal injury trial.  
 We all have a sense of whether an imagined construction is 
“proper” in a given situation—a sense formed and informed by our 
cultural memory, which serves an experiential warehouse in which 
we may comparison shop to determine if something is the “real deal.” 
This sense is informed by social practice, however, not by imagina-
tion. When imagined pain is situated within a narrative context, for 
example, it is the social practice in which this narrative context is 
embedded that triggers cultural memory, allowing us to evaluate the 
pain alongside other recollected (contextualized) pain-full images to 
which we have been directly or indirectly exposed. Thus, we need so-
cial practice to organize our imaginings so that they may resound 
within us, enabling us to attain a level of familiarity and comfort 
with another’s claims of pain. 
 Moreover, our imaginings of pain require a structure for purposes 
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of contextualization, and this structure can be derived only from ex-
pressions that draw upon ways of meaning-making familiar to our 
social practice. Unlike the unicorn, which we may invent on impulse, 
we need detail to conjure pain. Thus, attempts to access another’s 
pain are inherently bound up with and boundaried by the circum-
stances of which that pain is a consequence. Pain is always contextu-
alized; Scarry acknowledges that “inferences about the nature of the 
activity that produced the objects will follow from and be limited by 
the attributes of the chosen objects.”205 
 Yet this is not the whole picture; it is not the actual attributes of 
objects that delimit but the (publicly derived) meanings of those at-
tributes. Without a socially-defined meaning, the attributes them-
selves lack significance. Stating that we must know the context be-
fore imagining the pain simply means that our prior experiences 
with the external world unquestionably impact our construction of 
the imagined interior state of another. Just as we, as sufferers, must 
extend ourselves into the world to express our painful states, so must 
we, as interpreters of suffering, take the external world with us on 
our plunge into the dark, agonizing abyss of another’s interior. We 
call forth memories of our own pain when attempting to extend our-
selves into another’s suffering, invoking past ties to external reality 
which boundary our current experiences.206 When others report that 
they find another’s expressions of pain incredible, this simply means 
that that particular experience of pain is inaccessible in their social 
practice as it is currently constructed, thus rendering it imagina-
tively unavailable since it has no accessible parallel in the life world.  
 Therefore, as Wittgenstein argues, the interior states of the self 
are interdependent upon social practices in the life world. And the 
life world has intrapersonal repercussions as well; an inability to ex-
tend oneself into another’s pain means that pain is interpersonally 
unrecognizable and therefore unreal, truly a matter of doubt. We can 
effectively imagine only so far as our social, experiential tether 
stretches. Scarry asserts that imagination is “the ground of last re-
sort”; when the “world fails to provide an object, the imagination is 
there, almost on an emergency stand-by basis, as a last resource for 
the generation of objects.”207 Moreover, it “seems to provide a stan-
dard for judging the acceptability of objects in the naturally given 
world.”208 Here again, however, it is social practice and not imagina-
tion that is the “ground of last resort”; objects cannot be generated 
unless they are accorded social meaning that cannot be evolved 
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through private imaginings. It is social practice, not imagination, 
that provides the baseline comparison standard.  
B.   The Narrative Contribution 
1.   What Narrative Contributes to Imagination 
 Having seen what imagination lacks as compared to social prac-
tice as a grounding site for constructions of pain, we can explore 
what the most familiar and highly structured form of expressive so-
cial practice—language—adds to imaginative attempts to access an-
other’s pain. The narrative context is necessary to make pain both 
real and meaningful. Narratives are the “trajectories plotted upon 
material reality by our imagination,”209 structuring the communica-
tion of these pain-full constructs so as to enable the empathic en-
gagement between jury and plaintiff. 
 Narrative processes entail the formation of an empathic, not sym-
pathetic, connection between jury and plaintiff. Though it denotes an 
affinity or accord,210 a sympathetic identification does not penetrate 
as deeply as an empathic connection must, and it is not reciprocal in 
the sense of compelling a response. In contrast, empathy involves an 
identification that so intensely resounds in social practice that it in-
vites the projection of the self into another’s experience.211  
2.   The Trajectory of Pain 
 “Feeling” another’s pain, the personalization of pain’s full implica-
tions as construed by and through social practice, is not simply the 
result of throwing some empathic switch. Rather, it may be seen as a 
structural form of narrative continuity—a temporal continuum or 
trajectory of realization, the extremes of which are both states of 
pain. At one end of the trajectory, one is confronted with an expres-
sion that another is suffering from pain. Progress along the trajec-
tory is made by trying to access or imagine this pain. Halfway along 
the continuum, if this expression indeed resonates within the 
nonsufferer’s social practice, pain becomes comprehensible, and one 
may accept that the other is indeed in pain. But this realization is 
merely the halfway point; reaching the other end requires not only 
understanding but engagement. 
 If the utmost extremity of the continuum is reached, then one not 
only realizes that another is in pain but empathically recognizes that 
pain to such a degree that she herself is in pain from the need to re-
act and respond to it. Here, another’s physical pain has become so 
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real that it induces a corresponding, yet very different, pain in one’s 
self. This responsive pain is not a matter of bodily sensation but of 
relational identification and self-projection. It is also pain with an ob-
ject, because empathy always is a response to the other, a projection 
of the self into another. At this state—when empathy is achieved—
pain becomes an emotion. Its status as an emotion necessitates that 
it acquire an object since “emotions involve a focus on an intentional 
object and evaluative beliefs about that object.”212 Empathic pain 
takes as the intentional object of its focus the body of the sufferer and 
evaluates that object as being deserving of empathy and ultimately of 
compensation. We feel empathic pain for someone, just as we may 
express our fear, hatred, or loathing of something; realize that we are 
angry with someone; or become hungry or desirous for something. 
 To cure this empathic pain, the empathic sufferer must actually 
reach out to the suffering object of its empathy to communicate rec-
ognition of this pain and most likely to attempt to alleviate it as well. 
This is the pragmatic consequence of the narrative construction of 
the recipient of pain expressed as a potential care provider. Empathic 
pain is relieved only by the knowledge that one has done all one can, 
in which case pain might even turn into pleasure. This object-
fulfillment is analogous to that which, according to Scarry, occurs 
from the satisfaction of other interior states besides pain.213  
 This empathic continuum runs parallel to another, more obvious 
narrative continuum discussed earlier, an emplotted trajectory of 
pain and its experience comprised of a succession of occurrences 
temporally ordered so as to establish a legally significant relation-
ship between them.214 This continuum is the proffered explanation of 
the physical circumstances which caused the injury, the viability of 
which must be tied to the experience of pain for the expression of 
pain to flourish. It is this continuum which establishes the triangle 
between the evidence of pain (pain expressed), the object that caused 
the pain, and the agent who wielded that object to produce that 
pain.215 This chronology captures the invocation of an asserted narra-
                                                                                                                     
 212. NUSSBAUM, supra note 181, at 31. 
 213. As Scarry states, “A state of consciousness other than pain—such as hunger or de-
sire—will, if deprived of its object, begin to approach the neighborhood of pain, as in acute 
unsatisfied hunger or prolonged, objectless longing; conversely, when such a state is given 
an object, it is itself experienced as a pleasurable and self-eliminating (or more precisely, 
pleasurable because self-eliminating) physical occurrence.” SCARRY, supra note 20, at 166. 
 214. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
 215. Scarry describes this connection in terms of imagination and creativity instead of 
narrative, breaking it down into three “overarching statements” of creation or “making.” 
Id. at 280. First, creating as a phenomenon “resides in and arises out of the framing inten-
tional relation between physical pain on the one hand and imagined objects on the other, a 
framing relation that as it enters the visible world from the privacy of the human interior 
becomes work and its worked object.” Id. Second, this “now freestanding made object [the 
weapon or tool] is a projection of the live body that itself reciprocates the live body,” which 
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tive positioning of parties into the roles so meaningful to a legal 
chronology. Our familiarity with legal practice and trials, obtained 
through direct experience and/or mediated experiences through tele-
vision or print mediums, informs us that these narrative roles exist 
and that they are pivotal even before we can posit who or what may 
fill them. Thus, principle tenets of social practice, such as legal theo-
ries of culpability, must be established prior to the narrative posi-
tioning of actual parties and objects, creating a chronology in which a 
certain wound is inflicted by a particular object guided by an identi-
fied agent. Only after the jury has accepted the overlay of a specified 
legal relationship upon a chronology of events—and thus accepted 
the presence of pain, the culpability for pain, and the compensability 
of that pain—may the imaginary constructions be embodied in actual 
material entities and the narrative of agency come alive. Seen an-
other way, legal practices—rules of culpability, courtroom actors and 
their roles—are signs within a sign system of personal injury litiga-
tion. The specific assertion of embodied pain is but another sign that, 
if successfully constructed, effects an interpretation that activates all 
of that code’s potential. 
 It is the goal of the plaintiff’s counsel to construct such con-
tinuums, to persuade jurors that another is suffering pain, that 
something can and must be done about that pain, and that another 
person should accept responsibility for and compensate that pain. 
One might say that, although pain usually has no object, the task of 
law is not merely to express pain, but to construct for pain an appro-
priate, empathic object. To these ends, law must seize upon the dis-
tinction between a state of being and an object, where the importance 
of the object stems from its ability to eliminate the state of being.216 
Here is where pain expressed enters into the picture; it is the key ob-
ject-making component. This explains why the experience of pain is 
first separated from the plaintiff’s body so that it might be recognized 
in its own right, then reunited with that body to induce empathy, 
which makes the suffering body an object and creates in turn a corre-
sponding empathic pain. Through pain expressed, bodies as analytic 
objects are constructed before a suffering person as an empathic ves-
sel is produced and proffered to the jury as the product of that inter-
                                                                                                                     
“regardless of the peculiarities of the object’s size, shape, or color, and regardless of the 
ground on which it is broken open . . . will be found to contain within its interior a material 
record of the nature of human sentience out of which it in turn derives its power to act on 
sentience and recreate it.” Id. Thus, ladder as tool becomes ladder as weapon, tied into the 
legal chronology with the wound and the wielder, to the ends of culpability and compensa-
bility. Third and finally, “the created object itself [must] take[ ] two different forms, the 
imagined object and the materialized object: that is, ‘making’ entails the two conceptually 
distinct stages of ‘making-up’ and ‘making-real,’ ” in that “the imagination first ‘makes a 
fictional object’ and then ‘makes a fictional object into a nonfictional object.’ ” Id.  
 216. Id. at 167. 
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personal state to convey the potential for alleviating or eliminating 
the painful condition.217 Once the existence of pain is established, the 
fit between the pain and its empathic object establishes the “justice” 
of a particular legal solution.  
 Legal constructions that successfully communicate pain—
instances where signifier is united with signified to form sign—may 
be confident of earning a favorable response. Expression is never 
without communicative purpose, and in this context responses to le-
gal expressions of pain are so indelibly “natural” and “humane”—so 
ingrained in the moralities accessible through social practice—that 
they seem implied. Scarry, too, posits that the very thought of seeing 
another in pain entails wishing that person to be relieved of that pain.218 
 But while Scarry binds this wish to the imagination of pain,219 we 
have seen that this wish is dependent upon social practice, since 
imagination is not inherently communicative, and that it is bounda-
ried by the narrative context in which pain is constructed. After all, 
this curative urge is not inherent in imagination but is the logical re-
sult of a perceived, encultured moral obligation triggered by effective 
narrative structure and continuity. We know this because this trig-
ger is contextually specific and is not present in all pain-full in-
stances. One may imagine pain yet not wish it gone; we may feel that 
the sufferer deserves to feel the same pain he inflicted on others. And 
pain is sometimes expressed to effect pleasure, as the writings of the 
Marquis de Sade and many forms of media attest.  
 Martha Nussbaum, too, suggests that this wish fulfillment is trig-
gered by explicit narrative elements. In discussing the role of com-
passion in criminal sentencing, Nussbaum identifies numerous fac-
tors related to the formation of this merciful emotion. First, the exer-
cise of compassion “necessitates the thought that another person is 
undergoing something seriously bad.”220 Nussbaum emphasizes that, 
in evaluating another’s situation, we assume the position of “judi-
cious spectator” and thus “withhold compassion from people if we 
think that they are just ‘spoiled,’ moaning and groaning over some-
thing that is not really so bad.”221 We must also believe “that the per-
                                                                                                                     
 217. Id. at 168. 
 218. The perception of pain is never a static perception, but always implies a narrative 
evolution, a transformation from painful to painless. It is “not just a perception of an actu-
ality (the second person’s pain) but an alteration of that actuality (for embedded in the per-
ception is the sorrow that it is so, the wish that it were otherwise).” Id. at 289. 
 219. One cannot see pain without wishing it gone, and so the perception and the re-
sponse to that perception are bound together, again through the cause-and-effect potential 
of narrative. “[I]f the person does not perceive the distress, neither will he wish it gone; 
conversely, if he does not wish it gone, he cannot have perceived the pain itself.” Id. at 290. 
 220. NUSSBAUM, supra note 181, at 49. 
 221. Id. at 50. 
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son is not fully to blame for his or her plight.”222 Finally, it is helpful 
if we appraise the sufferer for whom we feel compassion as being 
similar in some sense to ourselves, so that “we put ourselves in the 
other person’s own shoes.”223 This identification is likely related to 
the formation of a “eudaimonistic judgment,” the “thought that the 
person in question is important to the person who has the emotion,” 
requiring that we care for the sufferer.224  
3.   Narrative Positioning and Power 
 All of these social practice “triggers” are established by effective 
narrative positioning. Therefore, once empathy has been achieved, 
social practice tells us that certain mandatory considerations follow: 
the recognition of another’s culpability and material responsibility 
for that pain, damages for suffering, payment of medical expenses. It 
is a lawyer’s job to create a fit between pain as sign and one or more 
of these compensatory methods. Lawyers hold in their hands the 
reins of narrative construction—emplotment, positioning, and invo-
cation of moral authority—and if they can bridle the trier of fact, 
may persuade it to hurdle over a succession of continual realizations, 
traveling along the continuums discussed previously, until it arrives 
at the appropriate empathic response. But the jury, as trier of fact, is 
actually the entity that must choose which interpretive project to ac-
cept or must negotiate between the two.  
 The ability to narratively construct another’s pain is a form of po-
litical power, just as the ability to effectively construct the needs and 
goals of others is the key to both successful politics and the successful 
encoding of perceptions into law. Adjudication is also an exercise of 
political power, since it necessitates the wielding of descriptive and 
actualizing powers. The trier of fact responds differently to the exer-
cise of adjudicative power according to the legal context in which it is 
asked to wield it. Issues of responsibility present in capital sentenc-
ing proceedings, for instance, do not exist in the context of civil litiga-
tion, which does not involve the literal choice between life and death 
and in which jury determinations of culpability allocate resources 
and do not take lives. Nonetheless, the jury’s role in a personal injury 
trial cannot be underemphasized. The jury is at once a politically 
powerful and vulnerable entity; while its power is granted by the 
mantle of jury duty, its weaknesses emerge by virtue of its human 
composition, since an innately human “instability of perception” renders 
all jurors “susceptib[le] to the prevailing description.”225 In civil personal 
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 225. SCARRY, supra note 20, at 279. 
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injury litigation, the jury’s power to arrive at and enforce a particular 
description of another’s self is ultimately an act of construction.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 In this Article, we have encountered two ideal models of pain. The 
first, which purports to see pain as a unitary concept that is entirely 
physical, has been adopted by the law in principal but not in practice, 
and this model is the same model that other fields such as critical 
health psychology have criticized. According to the unitary model of 
pain, pain as an embodied physical sensation is meaningful in its 
embodiment and thus is subjective or “private,” ascertainable only by 
the sufferer. This model’s dimensions lend themselves best to de-
scriptive dichotomies such as presence or absence and physical or 
mental, not to myriad semantic interpretations. Favored methods of 
communicating meaning are those that yield tangible evidence of a 
pain-full condition, including medical technologies such as x-rays and 
testing that objectify pain through its associated bodily causes. In-
deed, the communication of pain is conceived of through the meta-
phor of “translation,” in which one attempts to translate or distill 
pain as a physical experience into language, with unsatisfactory re-
sults. Thus, this model is quick to hone in on the insurmountable gap 
between experience and expression, labeling all communicative con-
structions of physical pain as incomplete and inferior constructions 
and paying little heed to the public meaning of the “private” experi-
ence. Taking a page from Wittgenstein,226 the attractiveness of the 
unitary pain model stems perhaps from the fact that it grants to pain 
the attributes of a physical object, albeit one that is “privately” ac-
quired and embodied, seeing it as something that results from a pre-
dictable cause and has certain ascertainable characteristics. Such a 
model necessarily focuses on the “private” meaning of pain, since it 
posits that the meaning of pain comes from pain itself and not from 
the sufferer. Meaning is therefore regarded as something that 
springs from pain’s very presence, instead of that which is co-
produced or negotiated. Pain is a state and not a construct.  
 Such a model, however, greatly diminishes the power of pain as 
an expressive entity and unnecessarily excludes the cast of charac-
ters in and for which pain is played. There is no real place for moral 
identity and interactive positioning in a dichotomy which reduces the 
potential for and implications of being and nonbeing to two opposite 
polar states. Because empathy is a largely a product of interaction-
ally constitutive processes and not of presence or absence, this model 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Recall Wittgenstein’s theory that the illusion that we privately “feel” pain comes 
from the confusion of language-games, the incorrect application of linguistic rules relating 
to physical objects to sensations. See supra Part II.B.2.  
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reduces interpersonal identification to inauthentic, simplistic terms. 
In addition, it fails to account for how pain’s presence and contours 
are apprehended—how pain comes to be a state, how we come to 
credit claims of pain. Such a conceptualization robs essential inter-
personal connections of their spark, effectively stating that empathy 
is fostered by objectively ascertainable evidence. 
 We have also encountered, however, another conceptualization of 
pain as a dual construct comprised of a physical sensation and an ex-
pressionistic construct that are both made meaningful through proc-
esses of contestation and negotiation informed by social practice. 
This revisionary model posits that it is the expressionistic dimen-
sions of pain, not the experiential, that is the primary source of 
meaning, enabling the consideration of a plurality of presences and 
effects. Pain is seen as a sign enmeshed in a social system of sign re-
lations, one that demands a complex response that is simultaneously 
logical and instinctual, rational and intuitive. Meaning does not 
evolve from pain itself, but from pain’s embeddedness in social prac-
tice. Such a model also acknowledges that all forms of evidence—
even those that are realizable through sight and sound or those en-
abled by medical technologies—evolve meaning and are assigned 
particularized meaning through social, not private, practices of 
sense-making. Thus, this model focuses on how public meaning is as-
signed and on deconstructing those processes that structure mean-
ing—such as boundarying, positioning, and ordering—as well as on 
what informs these structural choices.  
 From this vantage point, constructing pain is an inherently sub-
jective process, grounded in social practice and informed by an expe-
riential context, but one open to endless constructive and perceptual 
permutations. Pain as a dual construct anticipates a language-game, 
encouraging both the sufferer and the one to whom suffering is ex-
pressed to take advantage of its flexible layerings. It also facilitates 
the evolution of moral and interactional identities, allowing commu-
nicative participants to construct pain and to construct themselves in 
relation to pain. In addition, it accounts for and incorporates the idea 
of evolution—how pain changes and how we can both adapt to and 
alter pain. Not surprisingly, then, this perspective is uniquely 
equipped to exploit expressive potentials, to mold and meld that 
which simultaneously touches both the head and the heart.  
 If pain evolves through interpretation, then conscious attention 
must be paid to how we assist others to draw the conclusions we wish 
them to draw. Pain as a dual construct awakens us to these poten-
tials. The least we can do for the sufferer is to see her pain not as an 
unascertainable condition locked away from our understanding in 
her physical body but as a condition that we can publicly recognize, 
probe, and perhaps cure. Significantly, the process of curing requires 
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a willingness to construct—which again demonstrates the propriety 
of pain as a dual construct.   
 And so we come full circle, returning once again to the mythic 
scene in which the disguised Odysseus is recognized by his former 
nurse, Euryclea, and to the parallels between the power of that rec-
ognition and the processes by which we are awakened to an empathic 
connection that moves us to not only accord another the status of an 
authentic sufferer but also to assume a caring role in which we at-
tempt to somehow ameliorate that pain. Recognizing the communica-
tive potential of pain and suffering by acting on empathy is a neces-
sary first step to not only acknowledging the authenticity of these 
experiences but to respecting the human needs and relationships 
that underlie that empathy. An honest response is the least we owe 
to others on whose experiences we sit in judgment and offers the only 
means by which to recognize and reward those who, like Odysseus, 
seek to bring their burdens home, be accorded their due, and lay 
their suffering to rest. 
